Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination by HAINMUELLER, JENS & HANGARTNER, DOMINIK
American Political Science Review Vol. 107, No. 1 February 2013
doi:10.1017/S0003055412000494
Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A Natural Experiment in
Immigrant Discrimination
JENS HAINMUELLER Massachusetts Institute of Technology
DOMINIK HANGARTNER London School of Economics & University of Zurich
Westudy discrimination against immigrants using microlevel data from Switzerland, where, untilrecently, some municipalities used referendums to decide on the citizenship applications offoreign residents. We show that naturalization decisions vary dramatically with immigrants’
attributes, which we collect from official applicant descriptions that voters received before each referen-
dum. Country of origin determines naturalization success more than any other applicant characteristic,
including language skills, integration status, and economic credentials. The average proportion of “no”
votes is about 40% higher for applicants from (the former) Yugoslavia and Turkey compared to observ-
ably similar applicants from richer northern and western European countries. Statistical and taste-based
discrimination contribute to varying naturalization success; the rewards for economic credentials are
higher for applicants from disadvantaged origins, and origin-based discrimination is much stronger in
more xenophobic municipalities. Moreover, discrimination against specific immigrant groups responds
dynamically to changes in the groups’ relative size.
Immigration has emerged as a divisive political is-sue in many countries in recent decades. One ofthe most controversial debates over immigration
policy involves the integration of already-settled mi-
grants and, in particular, their access to citizenship.1
In the U.S., there are heated debates about restrict-
ing birthright citizenship for children of unauthorized
immigrants.2 Throughout Europe, right-wing parties
use citizenship policies as a vehicle to mobilize vot-
ers against immigrationwith campaigns that emphasize
the societal dangers of naturalizing increasing numbers
of immigrants (Dancygier 2010;Helbling 2008;Howard
2009). These groups reject the integration of foreign-
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Next Immigration Battle,” The New York Times, January 4, 2011.
Julia Preston, “Citizenship From Birth Is Challenged on the Right,”
The New York Times, August 6, 2010.
ers as citizens because they view immigrants as unde-
serving outsiders who poach jobs from native workers,
unsettle local communities, and undermine traditional
values; such outsiders should not be rewarded with
equal access to the political and social rights of the
host country (Brubaker 1989; Givens 2007; Koopmans
et al. 2005). Intense debates over naturalization poli-
cies are likely to escalate further in the years ahead in
light of increased migration flows; immigrants already
account for about 10% of the population across ad-
vanced industrialized countries (Dumont, Spielvogel,
and Widmaier 2010).
Why do some natives oppose and others favor im-
migration and naturalization of immigrants? Do na-
tives discriminate against particular types of immi-
grants, and if so, which immigrants are welcomed and
which immigrants are rejected? A large body of lit-
erature has examined attitudes toward immigration
in Europe, the U.S., and several other countries, but
scholars still disagree about the prevalence and causes
of anti-immigrant sentiment (Ceobanu and Escandell
2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2012). One important
limitation of existing research is the absence of de-
tailed behavioral data on anti-immigrant sentiment.
Most published studies to date are based on attitu-
dinal measures from public opinion surveys, which
have their merits, but also impose important limits
on the inferences we can draw. For example, most
existing surveys are fairly blunt instruments that ask
respondents only to describe their attitudes toward
immigration in general, although we expect that na-
tives’ views vary in important ways across different
types of immigrants (e.g., country of origin, skill level,
etc.).3 Another limitation is that many studies rely on
3 Exceptions include recent survey experiments that differentiate
immigrants with different attributes such as Brader, Valentino, and
Suhay (2008); Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004); Hain-
mueller and Hiscox (2010); Hopkins (2011); Harell, Soroka, and
Iyengar (2011). Due to constraints on survey design, these studies
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cross-sectional surveys, which makes it difficult to as-
sess how hostility toward immigrant groups varies over
time.4 Moreover, surveys put participants in anartificial
research setting where responses have almost no real-
life consequences, and therefore often boil down to
“top of the head” reactions that may inaccurately cap-
ture truebeliefs (BertrandandMullainathan 2001;Tay-
lor and Fiske 1978). Another well-recognized problem
is that answers to sensitive questions about immigra-
tion and racial policies can be biased by social desirabil-
ity effects, because respondents are unwilling to admit
to discriminatory attitudes in times when discrimina-
tion has become illegal and socially unacceptable in
many countries (Berinsky 1999; Kuklinski, Cobb, and
Gilens 1997).5
In light of these problems, some scholars have
turned to field experiments such as audit studies to
behaviorally measure racial discrimination in the labor
market and other economic domains (Adida, Laitin,
and Valfort 2010; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004;
Jowell and Prescott-Clarke 1970; List 2004). We take
a complementary approach and study discrimination
in naturalization decisions, drawing upon a natural ex-
periment from Switzerland that allows us to overcome
some of the inferential challenges mentioned above
and illuminates how discrimination against immigrants
varies across different types of immigrants and over
time.
In Switzerland, each municipality autonomously de-
cides on the naturalization applications of its for-
eign residents who seek Swiss citizenship. We focus
on the group of municipalities that until 2003 used
referendums6 with closed ballots to decide on natural-
ization requests. A typical naturalization referendum
involved two stages. Local voters first received official
voting leaflets that explained the pending naturaliza-
tion request with a detailed description of each im-
migrant applicant. Voters then cast a secret ballot on
each individual request, and applicants with a majority
of “yes” votes were granted Swiss citizenship. Draw-
ing upon local municipality archives, we collected a
new dataset that contains applicant characteristics and
voting outcomes for the 2,400 recorded naturalization
referendums held between 1970 and 2003 in the 44
Swiss municipalities that used secret ballot referen-
dums with voting leaflets. We use these data to exam-
ine how applicant characteristics affect the outcome of
naturalization referendums.
This research design has at least three advantages
compared to previous work. First, naturalization ref-
erendums enable us to measure revealed preferences
regarding immigrants based on actual behavior in a
typically distinguish only a small number of attributes (but see Hain-
mueller and Hopkins (2012)).
4 Exceptions include studies such as Scheve and Slaughter (2001);
Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky (2006); Hopkins (2010).
5 A recent report from the National Research Council’s Committee
onNational Statistics summarizes these inferential problems in racial
discrimination (Blank, Dabady, and Citro 2004).
6 We use “referendums” rather than “referenda” as the plural fol-
lowing the Oxford English Dictionary and previous literature.
real-world setting. Social desirability bias is not a con-
cern, because voters used secret ballots and needed
to provide no justification for their votes. Voters also
had to face the consequences of their voting behav-
ior, as naturalized immigrants instantly acquired the
same rights as existing members of the local citizenry
(including the right to vote and permanently stay in
the municipality). The data should therefore reveal a
fairly accurate assessment of the immigration prefer-
ences of the local voting population. As Bell Jr. (1978,
14) put it, referendum voting “enables voters’ racial
beliefs and fears to be recorded and tabulated in their
pure form.” Second, much like a real-world vignette
experiment, our data covers comparable application
decisions regarding thousands of immigrants with rad-
ically different attributes and at different points in
time, allowing us to pinpoint particular immigrant at-
tributes that are valued or disliked by local voters. This
data set also allows us to examine how discrimination
against particular immigrant groups varies over time
in response to immigration waves. Third, our design
enables us to minimize potential omitted variable bias,
since we measure and control for the same applicant
information from the official voting leaflets that voters
had at their disposal when they decided on the natu-
ralization requests. We also show that our main results
are insensitive to hidden bias that could arise from the
fact that some knowledgeable voters decided based
on private information about particular applicants that
extended beyond the information provided in the
leaflets.
When interpreting our results, it is important to em-
phasize the we capture only the effects of the applicant
characteristics in the last hurdle of the application pro-
cess, once a naturalization request was put to a popu-
lar vote. Since we do not capture additional forms of
potential discrimination that may have deterred immi-
grants from applying for citizenship in the first place,
our estimates are best understood as a lower bound on
the overall prevalence of discrimination in naturaliza-
tion outcomes in the sample municipalities.
We find that naturalization outcomes vary dramati-
cally across andwithinmunicipalities.Country of origin
is by far the most important determinant of natural-
ization success. The average proportion voting “no”
in the naturalization referendums is about 13–15 per-
centage points higher for applicants from (the former)
Yugoslavia and Turkey compared to observably sim-
ilar applicants from richer northern and western Eu-
ropean countries who apply in the same municipality
at the same time; this corresponds to a 40% increase
over the average proportion of “no” votes (or about
a 120% increase over the average probability of be-
ing rejected). This massive origin disadvantage is very
similar in smaller and larger municipalities and in-
sensitive to unobserved confounders with Rosenbaum
Gamma values between 9 and 11, indicating that it
would take an enormous hidden bias to explain away
the origin effects. We also find smaller origin penalties
for applicants from other groups, including applicants
from central and eastern European countries (6 per-
centage points), Asia (3 percentage points), and other
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non-European countries (7 percentage points), but no
disadvantage for applicants from southern Europe.
Taken together, origin alone accounts for about 40%
of the within-municipality variation in the proportion
of “no” votes.
Other immigrant characteristics also influence the
naturalization success. Voters systematically prefer ap-
plicants with better economic credentials (as measured
by occupational skill, education, and prior unemploy-
ment), applicants born in Switzerland, and applicants
with longer residency, but the effects of these charac-
teristics are very small compared to the origin effects.
We also find that language skills have almost no ef-
fect on naturalization success. Even applicants who are
described to voters as “perfectly fluent” in the Swiss-
German dialect earn no significant advantage. Simi-
larly, the assessed integration status of the applicant
plays very little role overall (the exception is applicants
who earn a slight advantage because they are described
to voters as being “completely indistinguishable” from
a Swiss native).
We use additional tests that consider statistical and
taste-based discrimination theories to illuminate the
mechanisms that may explain the varying treatment
of applicants based on their country of origin. Theo-
ries of statistical discrimination (Arrow 1972; Phelps
1972) suggest that if the average integration level of
immigrants varies by origin group, then voters, even
if all they care about is that applicants are sufficiently
well integrated, find it optimal to place some weight on
an applicant’s origin to make a better guess about her
true integration level (which is measured with noise
in the voting leaflets). This logic implies that voters
will reward an applicant more strongly for additional
observable credentials that are informative about her
integration status (such as higher educational attain-
ment) if the applicant belongs to an origin group that
is believed to have a lower average integration level.
Consistentwith this theoretical expectation, better eco-
nomic credentials strongly decrease the proportion of
“no” votes among applicants fromTurkey and (the for-
mer) Yugoslavia but have no effect among applicants
from richer northern and western European countries.
We also find evidence for theories of taste-based
discrimination (Allport 1979; Becker 1971) where a
“taste for discrimination” directly enters the utility
function of voters who are assumed to hold xenopho-
bic animus against immigrants from particular origin
groups. Consistent with this logic, we find that origin-
based discrimination steeply increases with the xeno-
phobic preferences of the local population (as mea-
sured by vote shares from federal anti-immigration
referendums); the origin penalty for applicants from
(the former) Yugoslavia and Turkey almost triples in
the most, compared to the least, xenophobic munici-
palities. Overall, these results indicate that statistical
discrimination may account for about 40% and taste-
based discrimination for about 60%of the origin-based
discrimination in our sample.
Consistent with group conflict theories that link the
rise of xenophobic animus to a defensive reaction of
natives who view immigrant out-groups as a threat to
the natives’ dominant position (Blalock 1967; Blumer
1958; Quillian 1995), we also find that origin-based
discrimination is dynamically correlated to changes
in the relative sizes of the different origin groups.
While discrimination against applicants from Turkey
and (the former) Yugoslavia increases following the
rapid growth of these groups during the 1990s, dis-
crimination against immigrants from southern Euro-
pean origins abates as the relative size of this group
decreases.
Our study contributes to several literatures. First,
our findings have important implications for the re-
search that studies the prevalence and drivers of
anti-immigrant sentiment (e.g., Brader, Valentino, and
Suhay 2008; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Hainmueller
and Hiscox 2007; 2010; Sides and Citrin 2007; Snider-
man, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). Although most
studies to date are based on survey data and consider
only attitudes toward immigration in general, our re-
sults provide clear behavioral evidence that natives
do not treat all immigrants equally but instead draw
important distinctions between different types of im-
migrants and that these preferences are not static but
vary over time. Our results also show that measure-
ment matters: the immigrant preferences revealed in
our behavioral data contrast sharply with immigra-
tion preferences as measured by comparable public
opinion surveys, which are prone to social desirability
bias. Second, our findings resonate with the literature
on racial discrimination (e.g., Altonji and Blank 1999;
Blank, Dabady, and Citro 2004; Pager and Shepherd
2008). While most of this work has focused on race-
and gender-based discrimination in the labor market,
our results demonstrate that naturalization decisions
for resident aliens can be subject to similar types
of discrimination, and that similar theoretical mech-
anisms provide explanatory leverage to account for
this discrimination. Third, by comparing microlevel
data about individual naturalization decisions across
several municipalities, our study adds to the small but
growing literature in immigration studies that has be-
gun to examine outcomes and policies at the local
level, where more focused comparisons are less vul-
nerable to biases from unobserved heterogeneity that
often plague cross-national research (e.g., Adida 2011;
Dancygier 2010; Helbling 2008; Hopkins 2010). Fourth,
our findings add new empirical evidence to the ex-
tensive literature and policy debates about citizenship
policies and the integration of already settled immi-
grants (e.g., Freeman 2004; Givens 2007; Hochschild
and Mollenkopf 2009). Finally, our study contributes
to the literature that studies the relationship between
direct democracy and the protection of minorities’
civil rights (e.g., Frey and Goette 1998; Gamble 1997;
Hajnal, Gerber, and Louch 2002; Maskin and Tirole
2004).Our results provide evidence that, in the absence
of other institutional safeguards, referendum voting
can result in systematic discrimination against particu-
lar minority groups who find themselves at the whim of
the native majority. This finding informs ongoing pol-
icy debates about reforming the Swiss naturalization
system.
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CITIZENSHIP POLICY IN CONTEXT
Before we turn to the empirical analysis, it is helpful
to put the Swiss naturalization system in a compara-
tive perspective and discuss the potential benefits of
obtaining Swiss citizenship.
The Swiss Naturalization System
Ever since classical Athens, states have used citizen-
ship as a closure mechanism to define a select group
of members who belong to a polity and enjoy special
privileges denied to nonmembers. Historically, eligi-
bility criteria for citizenship often included attributes
such as class, wealth, ethnicity, race, and gender, and
requirements frequently changed over time to accom-
modate developments in state capacity (Bellamy 2008).
In Switzerland, this link between citizenship and state
building gave rise to a systemof triple citizenship,which
defines Swiss citizenship based on citizenship in a mu-
nicipality, a canton, and the Confederation (Helbling
2008, 12–17). This three-tiered system is unique in that
it delegates responsibility for naturalizing foreigners
largely to the municipal level. Federal laws impose
formal naturalization requirements, but an immigrant
cannot obtain a Swiss passport without acquiring citi-
zenship of a municipality, and municipalities enact the
naturalization procedures and ultimately decide on the
applications.7 This contrasts with many other countries
where naturalization procedures and criteria are typi-
cally defined at the federal level and implemented by
federal ministries or agencies (as in the U.S., France,
Canada, and Belgium). Other countries have hybrid
regimes where rules are stipulated at the federal level,
but applications are checked and decided at the re-
gional level (as in Germany and Austria).8
In general, Switzerland is often categorized as part
of the group of countries with relatively restrictive citi-
zenship regimes, such as Germany, Denmark, Austria,
and Greece (Goodman 2010). In the other pool are
countries with more liberal citizenship regimes such
as France, the UK, Belgium, and the U.S. Although
naturalization regimes are complex and generally dif-
ficult to compare across countries, the more restrictive
countries are typically characterized by the fact that
they rely on the jus sanguinis principle, which implies
that citizenship is passed on from the citizenship of the
parents, rather than granted based on the place of birth.
More liberal countries also typically require around 5
years of permanent residence, while more restrictive
regimes require up to 8 to 10 years before resident im-
migrants become eligible for citizenship.9 More restric-
7 The federal level exclusively controls access to Swiss citizenship
through descent, marriage, and adoption. Cantons rarely regulate
local naturalization policies, with the exception of Geneva where
naturalizing foreigners is centralized at the canton level.
8 Some studies suggest that significant within-country variation ex-
ists in the handling of naturalization applications. Such differences
have been found between German La¨nder, Austrian regions, French
regional offices, and even U.S. district offices (Helbling 2008, 18–19).
9 Switzerland requires 12 years of residence, but years between ages
10 and 20 count double; at least 3 of the 12 years must fall within
tive regimes also typically require renunciation of prior
citizenship and do not allow naturalized immigrants to
hold multiple passports. Switzerland introduced mul-
tiple citizenship for naturalized immigrants in 1992,
in contrast to many of the traditionally more restric-
tive countries. Almost all Western countries, including
Switzerland, also have additional naturalization crite-
ria that require a clean criminal record, some evidence
of financial self-sufficiency, and, in many cases, demon-
strated mastery of the country’s official language(s).
Several countries, such as Switzerland, also require that
applicants demonstrate knowledge of the country and
meet a standard of integration.10
About 2 in 100 foreigners were naturalized in
Switzerland in 2000. Although southern European
countries like Spain, Italy, and Portugal experienced
even lower naturalization rates in the same year, sev-
eral OECD countries had higher rates with 2.5% in
Germany, 3% in the U.S., and 4% in the UK (OECD
2003, 93).Despite the relatively lownaturalization rate,
Switzerland has experienced a sizeable immigration
inflow over the last three decades. By 2000, the share
of the non-naturalized immigrant population reached
25% in Switzerland, by far the highest level among
all other Western countries except Luxembourg; for
comparison, the share of the foreign-born population
in the same year was 15% in the United States, 13%
in Germany, and 9% in the UK (Dumont, Spielvogel,
and Widmaier 2010).
With the increased immigration flows in recent
decades, citizenship policies have become heavily
politicized in many Western countries, as right-wing
parties have discovered the topic is an effective spring-
board for mobilizing voters against immigration. In
Switzerland, the Swiss People’s Party has repeatedly
emphasized the need to restrict access to citizen-
ship and immigration inflows, campaigning against
“mass naturalizations” with signs that portray brown,
black, andwhite hands snatching Swiss passports. Anti-
immigrant political movements such as the Freedom
Party inAustria, theNational Front inFrance, theDVU
inGermany, and theDanishPeople’s Party inDenmark
have similarly mobilized voters against immigration by
highlighting the societal dangers of liberal citizenship
policies. Conflicts over naturalization policy are there-
fore an important part of the general phenomenon
the 5 years preceding the naturalization request (Bu¨rgerrechtsgesetz,
Chap. 15).
10 In Switzerland the federal requirements for ordinary naturaliza-
tion are as follows: the applicant is integrated into the Swiss context,
is familiar with the Swiss way of life, adapts to the laws, traditions,
and customs, respects the legal order, and poses no threat to the
internal and external security of Switzerland (Bu¨rgerrechtsgesetz,
Chap. 14). Regarding the integration requirement, Switzerland may
be most comparable to countries such as Austria, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, and Germany that have explicit or implicit integration
requirements for applicants. France requires “assimilation.” TheU.S.
requires applicants to demonstrate English proficiency and basic
knowledge of U.S. history and government. The U.S. also requires
that applicants are of “good moral character,” which is usually de-
fined to mean that applicants are law abiding and provide truth-
ful information during the interviews. See Goodman (2010) for a
summary.
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of anti-immigrant sentiment (Brubaker 1989; Dancy-
gier 2010; Givens 2007; Howard 2009; Koopmans et al.
2005).11
The Benefits of Swiss Citizenship
Why would immigrants seek Swiss citizenship? For the
1970–2003 period covered in our study, almost all eli-
gible immigrants applying for ordinary naturalization
have a settlement permit, and therefore share many of
the same rights and benefits as Swiss citizens, such as
the right to choose their employers, access to health
benefits, the right to travel and return, and the respon-
sibility to pay taxes. However, Swiss citizenship still
carries an important symbolic value as a visible marker
of full membership in the host country. Citizenship also
comes with several tangible benefits. First, only citi-
zens have the right to vote in the many local, cantonal,
and federal referendums and elections, and the right to
run for office or express their concerns at municipality
assemblies.12 Second, only children born to citizens au-
tomatically receive Swiss citizenship at birth; children
born to foreign residents have to apply throughnatural-
ization procedures. Third, only citizens have the right
to stay in Switzerland indefinitely, while the settlement
permit can theoretically be challenged if immigrants
return to their home country for more than 6 months
(Wanner and Piguet 2002, 919). Fourth, certain jobs
formally require Swiss citizenship.13 Fifth, citizenship
may improve immigrants’ economic prospects. Corre-
lational studies from several countries document a pos-
itive relationship between naturalization and higher
wages and employment (see, for example, OECD
2011). Citizenship can signal to employers higher lev-
els of human capital and lower risk of return migra-
tion. Citizenship can also give immigrants an edge in
the hiring process when employers discriminate based
on nationality. Fibbi, Kaya, and Piguet (2003) doc-
ument strong discrimination against non-naturalized
immigrants among Swiss employers. In sum, a Swiss
passport provides more than just symbolic value for
immigrants. Citizenship marks the difference between
being a tolerated resident who may express her views
and being “entitled to have them heard on an equal
basis” (Bellamy 2008, 12).14 Naturalization therefore
11 This link between immigration and naturalization policy is also
present in public opinion data. For example, in theU.S. a 2006Gallup
poll found that among respondents who supported a decrease in the
level of immigration, 60%were also in favor of denying birthright cit-
izenship to children of unauthorized immigrants (compared to only
29% among respondents who favored an increase in immigration
levels). In Switzerland, voting results from referendums that involve
restrictions on immigration are typically highly correlated with vot-
ing results from referendums that involve changes to naturalization
policy.
12 Only very few (and none of our sample) municipalities allow im-
migrants with settlement permits to vote at themunicipal or cantonal
level.
13 For example, several public employers only hire Swiss citizens: the
military, publicly owned defense companies, several cantonal police
forces, the border guard corps, and the Foreign Service.
14 Although rejected applicants keep their permit, at themoment we
can only speculate about how a rejection may affect an immigrant’s
provides an important indicator for the level of soci-
etal integration and reciprocity between natives and
immigrant populations.
EXPLAINING NATURALIZATION DECISIONS
Immigrants who seek Swiss citizenship have to apply
via the ordinary naturalization procedure at three ad-
ministrative levels: federal, cantonal, and municipal.15
Although the federal and cantonal authorities check
if an applicant fulfills the basic eligibility requirements
such as the residency period and clean criminal record,
each municipality evaluates the merits of its applicants
and ultimately decides on naturalization requests. In
our sample period, 1973–2003, municipalities used a
wide variety of institutions to vote on local naturaliza-
tion requests. Most municipalities used direct demo-
cratic arrangements in which citizens voted on appli-
cations in popular votes by hand-raising at regular
meetings of the citizens’ assembly. Other municipali-
ties delegated the naturalization decision to the elected
municipality council where politicians voted on the ap-
plications (see Hainmueller and Hangartner 2012 for
an overview of the various institutions).
In this study, we focus on the relatively small sub-
sample of “ballot box”municipalities that used popular
votes with secret ballots to decide on citizenship appli-
cations. This institutional arrangement provides per-
haps the purest formof direct democracy and resonates
with the political culture in Switzerland, which empha-
sizes local autonomy and direct democratic principles.
This arrangement also has historical antecedents in the
polis of Athens.16 A typical naturalization referendum
in our ballot box municipalities involved a two-step
process in which citizens received an official voting
leaflet with re´sume´s that detailed information about
each immigrant applicant (below we provide a list of
reported applicant characteristics). Voters then cast a
secret ballot to reject or approve each naturalization
request, and applicants with a majority of “yes” votes
were granted Swiss citizenship. Voting on citizenship
requests was part of the typical Swiss direct democratic
routine in which referendums were used at regular
intervals to decide on a wide variety of municipal,
life. In a follow-up project, we use a regression discontinuity design
to study the impacts of citizenship by surveying immigrants whose
applications were narrowly decided.
15 Here and for the rest of the study, we focus on “ordinary” natural-
ization which is by far the most common naturalization mode.We do
not consider “facilitated” naturalization granted by a special process
that does not involve the municipality. This special track is open
only for immigrants who have been married to a Swiss citizen for at
least three years and have been living in Switzerland a total of five
years. Also notice that children who are born to a Swiss mother or
Swiss father are typically granted citizenship at birth. This is not the
case for children who are born in Switzerland to immigrant parents.
Such children typically have to apply through the regular process for
“ordinary” naturalization and are thus included in our analysis.
16 In ancient Athens, the citizens’ assembly ecclesia decided on the
naturalization applications of individuals and sometimes even whole
groups (e.g., after outstanding services in wars) by closed ballot
voting (cf. (Pseudo-)Demosthenes against Neaera (Demosthenes
1949)).
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cantonal, and federal matters. Typically, voters cast
their ballots at the local polling place, and naturaliza-
tion referendums appeared on the ballots alongside
other referendums that took place on the same day.17
Although, historically, relatively few municipalities
used naturalization referendums to decide on citizen-
ship applications, thepractice recently sparkedpolitical
debates following media reports about seemingly dis-
criminatory rejection of applicants. One such case was
brought before the Swiss Federal Court, which in July
2003 ruled that closed ballot voting for naturalization
referendums violates the Swiss Constitution (BGE 129
I 232 andBGE129 I 217). The Federal Court argued on
two different levels. The key reason for ruling against
naturalization referendums was that immigrants have
the right to appeal rejected applications (BGE 129 I
217), and therefore the decision-making body is obli-
gated to provide justification for the rejection.18 Since
the very nature of closed ballot referendums means
that voters do not have to justify their decisions, the
court reasoned that such procedures cannot be used
for naturalization. Interestingly, the Federal Court also
explicitly mentioned the danger that an applicant may
be rejected simply because of her affiliation in a certain
“ethnic-cultural group” (BGE 129 I 232: 241), which
violates the antidiscrimination clause provided by the
Swiss Constitution.19 In response to the Federal Court
rulings, ballot box municipalities changed their nat-
uralization procedures, and most transferred the au-
thority for naturalization decisions to the municipality
council.20
The court rulings triggered heated debates about the
use of closed ballot naturalization referendums. The
Swiss People’s Party launched persistent campaigns ar-
guing that “the people” should have full discretion over
the naturalization process, and public support for this
position remains strong.21 In 2006, the Swiss People’s
17 Although the format of the voting leaflets varied somewhat across
our ballot box municipalities, the leaflets contained broadly similar
information about the applicants. The ballots used to vote on citizen-
ship requests were also broadly similar, but there was some variation
in the amount of applicant information listed on the ballot. Some
ballots just listed the applicant’s name while others included more
characteristics drawn from the voter leaflets, such as age, country of
origin, or job title. To the best of our knowledge, ballots never in-
cluded additional applicant information that was not included in the
leaflets. The format of the leaflets and ballots typically did not change
over time in a given municipality in our sample period. These time-
invariant factors will therefore be absorbed into the municipality
fixed effects in the regression analysis. Appendix C shows examples
of leaflets and ballots that we extracted from municipal archives.
18 Otherwise, the decision-making body violates paragraph §29 II of
the Swiss Constitution that covers general procedural safeguards.
19 The relevant paragraph §8 II of the Swiss Constitution states:
Nobody may be discriminated against, namely, because of origin,
race, gender, age, language, social position, or way of life; religious,
ideological, or political convictions, or becauseof aphysical ormental
disability.
20 In a follow-up project, we exploit this shift to identify the effects
of different institutional regimes on naturalization outcomes (Hain-
mueller and Hangartner 2012).
21 In a 2008 poll, 47% of Swiss voters agreed that naturaliza-
tion must be decided by the Swiss people (“U¨ber Einbu¨rgerungen
muss das Schweizer Volk entscheiden ko¨nnen” Vox poll 06/01/2008.
Item: arg01x). In a 2004 poll, 40% of Swiss voters agreed that the
Party successfully collected the 100,000 signatures nec-
essary for a federal initiative that, by changing the Swiss
Constitution, would grant municipalities full discretion
over naturalization (including, of course, secret ballot
voting) and remove the rejected applicant’s right to
appeal. Although this particular initiative “for demo-
cratic naturalization” was rejected by 64% of voters in
2008, related popular initiatives at the cantonal level
are already being prepared and will ensure continuing
politicization of the issue in the ongoing reformdebates
about naturalization policy.
Empirical Strategy
Closed ballots and voting leaflets are the two main
features of the research design that allow us to over-
come some of the inferential challenges typically asso-
ciated with studying immigrant discrimination (Blank,
Dabady, andCitro 2004). Thefirst feature addresses the
measurement problem: the anonymity of closed ballot
voting guards against social desirability effects. Unlike
surveys in which answers bear almost no real-life con-
sequences for respondents, in our case, preferences are
revealed by voters in a real-world setting where the
respondents are not aware of the research context and
must face the consequences of their voting behavior.
The second feature addresses the causal identifica-
tion problem: Official voting leaflets summarizing the
applicant characteristics were sent to all citizens usu-
ally about two to six weeks before each naturalization
referendum. Since we retrieved the voting leaflets from
the municipal archives, we measure the same applicant
information from the leaflets that the citizens observed
when they voted on the citizenship applications. Since
most voters simply draw on the leaflets to decide on
the applicants, this design enables us to greatly mini-
mize potential omitted variable bias and attribute dif-
ferences in naturalization outcomes to the effects of
differences in measured applicant characteristics. For
example, imagine that voters are faced with observably
similar applicants who only differ in their country of
origin, say Italy and (the former) Yugoslavia. If voters
reject the Yugoslavian applicants at a higher rate than
Italians, then we can attribute the difference in natu-
ralization success to the difference in the country of
origin, based on the assumption that a typical voter has
no private information about the applicants that goes
beyond the information provided in the leaflets and
can be used to systematically discriminate between the
applicants. Notice that this assumptionmay be violated
for a subset of knowledgeable voters who cast their bal-
lot based onprivate information about an applicant, for
example, because they are friends with the applicant or
have been exposed to gossip about the applicant that
goes beyond the information provided in the leaflet.
We discuss this possibility in separate sections below
federal level should not interfere with cantonal and municipal au-
tonomy to regulate naturalization policy (“Der Bund hat sich nicht
in die Kompetenzen der Kantone und Gemeinden auf dem Gebiet
des Einbu¨rgerungswesens einzumischen” Vox poll 09/26/2004. Item:
arg06x).
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and show that our main results are robust to hidden
bias that may arise from private information.
Before we proceed to the estimation, we remind
readers that the scope of our analysis is limited to
estimating the effects of applicant characteristics, con-
ditional on the fact that the application was put to a
popular vote. The internal validity of our estimates is
therefore not compromised by the selection of immi-
grants into applying for citizenship in the first place.
Once anapplicationwasput to the vote,weobserve and
control for the same applicant characteristics that vot-
ers learned about from the voting leaflets. That said, the
fact that we condition on the voting stage implies that
we can detect potential discrimination only among the
group of fairly well-integrated immigrants who have
completed the eligibility criteria and chosen to apply
for citizenship. Our study is not designed to capture ad-
ditional forms of discrimination that may deter eligible
immigrants from applying for citizenship in the first
place because they are discouraged by municipality
officials, anticipate a discriminatory voting outcome,
or deem the costs of applying to be higher than the
expected benefits (Steiner and Wicker 2004). Our re-
sults are therefore best interpreted as a lower bound
for the overall prevalence of discrimination against
immigrants in the naturalization process of ballot box
municipalities.22
Data and Sample
To construct our data, we first identified ballot box
municipalities that used referendum voting with secret
ballots to decide on naturalization requests before the
court ruling in 2003. Since data on municipal decision
making was unavailable, we compiled a list of all mu-
nicipality offices and fielded a survey to the Gemein-
deschreiber (head secretaries) to collect information
about the history of the local naturalization process.
This survey yielded an overall response rate of 60%;
the coveragewas 74%for largermunicipalities that had
at least 10 naturalizations in 2000.23 To complement the
data, we also contacted canton officials and searched
22 Empirically, the number of applications in amunicipality is closely
proportional to its size,which suggests that the selection into applying
is mostly driven by the demand side and does not vary much across
municipalities. One reason is that the spatial mobility of immigrant
applicants is very limited. For the pre-2003 period covered by this
study, immigrants were required to have a job in Switzerland before
entering the country and therefore chose the area for their initial set-
tlement mainly based upon geographic proximity to their workplace.
Moreover, immigrants whose naturalization requests were rejected
could not simply move to a neighboring municipality and immedi-
ately re-apply for citizenship. Instead, they had to wait for several
years because municipalities commonly require that applicants have
to reside in the municipality for four to six years before applying for
citizenship. Also note that once an applicant has reached the voting
stage, withdrawals of applications are extremely rare (one case out
of the 2,430 applicants in our sample).
23 We fielded the survey in 2010 using an online survey tool. The
questionnaire is available upon request. The included municipalities
capture about 80% of the Swiss population since the nonresponse is
concentrated among the smallest municipalities that had no natural-
ization requests during our period and therefore did not complete
our survey.
newspaper archives and municipality websites for ad-
ditional reports about municipalities with naturaliza-
tion referendums.24 Overall, we identified 44 ballot
box municipalities, which are defined as municipalities
that (1) used secret ballot naturalization referendums
at some point before 2003 and (2) sent voters leaflets
with information about applicants. To the best of our
knowledge, this constitutes a complete list.25 Members
of the research team then visited each municipality
and extracted the official voting leaflets with applicant
information and the vote counts for all ordinary nat-
uralization requests documented in the municipality
archive for the period from 1970 to 2003.
Table 1 displays basic information about the sample.
Ballot box municipalities were located in seven dif-
ferent cantons, and all were in the German-speaking
region. The average municipality had 4,029 registered
voters (in 2003), although the size varied considerably
from 563 registered voters in Oberiberg to 22,441 vot-
ers in Chur. Overall, the sample includes 2,429 nat-
uralization referendums. The period coverage varies
somewhat due to differences in data availability, but for
most municipalities, we collected data on all natural-
ization referendums going back to the 1970s and 1980s.
The average municipality had about 55 naturalization
referendums in our sample period, and the number
of referendums was strongly proportional to the mu-
nicipality size (a bivariate regression indicates that a
1% increase in the number of voters is associated with
about a 1.1% increase in the number of applications
(t value > 8.6)).
Although all municipalities in our sample used pop-
ular votes with secret ballots to decide on naturaliza-
tion requests, the details of the voting process var-
ied somewhat. In 70% of the municipalities, voters
cast their secret ballots for the naturalization refer-
endums at the local polling place and usually with
their votes on other contemporaneous municipal, can-
tonal, or federal referendums.26 Turnout for such nat-
uralization referendums was about 40% on average,
and was mainly driven by the turnout for referen-
dums on the other municipal, cantonal, and federal
matters that were voted on the same day.27 In a small
24 We searched the archives of the Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung and Tage-
sanzeiger as well as the website of the watchdog group GRA.
25 One exception is the recently merged municipalities Glarus,
Glarus Nord, and Glarus Su¨d, which were not able to locate the
applicant data after the merger. We also did not include a few very
small municipalities that had fewer than four applicants in this time
period.
26 Voters typically received the ballots by mail so that they could fill
them out at home before submitting them at the local polling place.
27 Average turnout for federal referendums was about 44–46%
during our sample period. To investigate the link between federal
referendums and local naturalization referendums, we merged the
turnout data for our naturalization referendums with municipality-
level turnout for federal referendums that were voted on during
the same day and found that both are very highly correlated. A
one percentage point increase in turnout for federal referendums
is associated with about a one percentage point increase in turnout
for naturalization referendums (t value > 6), and the link gets even
stronger when municipality and year fixed effects are included in the
regression (t value > 13). This suggests that similar voters typically
participated in both types of referendums.
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TABLE 1. Ballot Box Municipalities with Naturalization Referendums
Municipality Canton Constituency Voting Location Period Voters Referendums
Altdorf UR All voters Polling place 1986–2003 6,002 72
Altendorf SZ All voters Polling place 1979–2003 3,287 53
Arth SZ All voters Polling place 1977–2003 1,299 79
Beckenried NW All voters Citizen assembly 1987–2003 2,133 8
Bu¨hler AR All voters Polling place 1979–2003 965 29
Buochs NW All voters Citizen assembly 1980–2003 3,586 34
Chur GR Burghers only Polling place 1978–2003 22,441 240
Dallenwil NW All voters Citizen assembly 1983–2002 1,204 14
Davos GR Burghers only Burgher assembly 1978–2002 6,969 159
Einsiedeln SZ All voters Polling place 1977–2003 8,904 78
Emmen LU All voters Polling place 1999–2003 15,767 87
Ennetmoos NW All voters Citizen assembly 1982–2003 1,386 6
Feusisberg SZ All voters Polling place 1979–2003 2,765 48
Freienbach SZ All voters Polling place 1992–2003 9,377 102
Gais AR All voters Polling place 1978–2002 1,948 20
Galgenen SZ All voters Polling place 1987–2003 2,781 32
Gersau SZ All voters Polling place 1984–2003 1,339 31
Heiden AR All voters Polling place 1973–1992 2,551 35
Hergiswil NW All voters Citizen assembly 1978–2003 3,915 62
Ingenbohl SZ All voters Polling place 1970–2003 5,201 113
Ku¨ssnacht SZ All voters Polling place 1972–2003 7,778 124
Lachen SZ All voters Polling place 1971–2003 4,203 156
Malters LU All voters Polling place 1982–2003 4,188 35
Morschach SZ All voters Citizen assembly 1992–1997 591 4
Oberiberg SZ All voters Polling place 1995–2003 563 4
Reichenburg SZ All voters Polling place 1990–2003 1,781 25
Rothenthurm SZ All voters Polling place 1976–2003 1,331 13
Schu¨belbach SZ All voters Polling place 1970–2003 4,338 59
Schwyz SZ All voters Polling place 1972–2003 9,589 178
Speicher AR All voters Polling place 1978–2003 2,808 24
St. Margrethen SG All voters Polling place 1982–2002 2,678 65
Stans NW All voters Citizen assembly 1978–2003 5,172 55
Stansstad NW All voters Citizen assembly 1978–2003 3,344 42
Steinen SZ All voters Polling place 1980–2003 1,984 9
Teufen AR All voters Mixed 1978–2002 4,145 65
Trogen AR All voters Citizen assembly 1978–2003 1,274 39
Tuggen SZ All voters Polling place 1994–2003 1,800 34
Unteriberg SZ All voters Polling place 2002 1,559 4
Urna¨sch AR All voters Polling place 1979–2003 1,536 25
Walzenhausen AR All voters Polling place 1979–2002 1,346 13
Wangen SZ All voters Polling place 1987–2003 3,046 41
Weggis LU All voters Polling place 1979–2002 2,500 17
Wolfenschiessen NW All voters Citizen assembly 1997–2003 1,385 5
Wollerau SZ All voters Polling place 1977–2003 4,495 86
Mean 4,029 55
Note: Teufen voted on naturalization requests at the polling place. Cantons are Appenzell Outer-Rhodes (AR), Grisons (GR),
Lucerne (LU), Nidwalden (NW), Schwyz (SZ), St. Gall (SG), and Uri (UR). Voting location refers to the place where voters submit
their secret ballots. Number of voters is measured in 2003. Referendums refers to the total number of collected naturalization
referendums that were voted on in a given municipality over the period. See text for details.
number of ourmunicipalities, voting on local matters—
including citizenship requests—took place at the citi-
zens’ assembly. Secret ballots were also used in these
cases, but the average turnout was lower (around 18%)
since fewer citizens typically attended the assembly
meetings. Two municipalities, Chur and Davos, fur-
ther restricted the voting on naturalization requests
to the Burghers, a select group of about 20% of fam-
ilies who have lived in the municipality for a long
time.
Before we turn to the empirical analysis, we consider
how the sample of ballot box municipalities compares
with other Swiss municipalities. Overall, our sample
covers about 4% of all municipalities and about 4% of
the Swiss population in our time period. One concern
for external validity is that the municipal naturaliza-
tion procedure is endogenous to the local community’s
immigration preferences. If, for example, more xeno-
phobic municipalities opted for popular votes because
this institution makes it easier to discriminate against
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TABLE 2. Ballot Box Municipalities in Comparison
Other German Other
Ballot Box All Other Swiss Speaking Non-German
Municipalities Municipalities Municipalities Speaking Municipalities
Proportion foreign born (0-1) 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.29
Naturalization rate (0-1) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Proportion aged 65+ (0-1) 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.16
Proportion high education (0-1) 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.26
Proportion high skill (0-1) 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08
Female labor force participation (0-1) 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.44
Unemployment rate (0-1) 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
SVP vote share (0-1) 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.05
Anti-immigration vote share (0-1) 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.30
Municipality size (#) 5,539 2,179 2,928 1,802
Note: Covariates are measured in the year 1990 except for SVP vote share which is measured in 1991, the anti-immigration vote
share which is measured in 1988, and the age distribution, the proportion of citizens with high education (qualification required for
university entrance), and the female labor force participation which are all based on the 2000 census. All means are weighted by the
size of the native population except for municipality size.
immigrants, then our results may be best interpreted as
an upper bound for the overall level of discrimination
(compared to other Swiss municipalities). Although
systematic data on this issue has not been collected,
the available anecdotal evidence suggests that munic-
ipalities commonly chose their naturalization proce-
dures many decades before our sample period when
immigration became politicized and presumably did
not radically alter their institutions until forced to
do so by the 2003 Federal Court decision (Argast
2006).28
In Table 2, we compare ballot box municipalities
with other Swiss municipalities on various characteris-
tics in 1990 (roughly the middle of our study period).
We find that ballot box municipalities are fairly sim-
ilar to the rest of Switzerland regarding the share of
the foreign-born population, the naturalization rate,
the proportion of elderly, highly educated, and highly
skilled, the female labor forceparticipation, and theun-
employment rate. The average vote share of the Swiss
People’s Party in the 1991 federal elections and support
for a federal anti-immigration referendum advocating
restrictive immigration laws in 1988 are lower in ballot
box municipalities than in the rest of Switzerland, indi-
cating that the former are on average perhaps slightly
less xenophobic. The only considerable difference is
that ballot box municipalities are somewhat larger on
average. Most municipalities in Switzerland are fairly
small, while our sample includes a relatively high share
of larger towns such as Chur, Emmen, and Schwyz.
In sum, the comparison reveals that ballot box mu-
nicipalities are not very different for a range of rel-
evant characteristics from other Swiss municipalities,
in particular municipalities in the German-speaking
region.
28 For example, based on our municipality survey, about 90% of all
Swiss municipalities did not change their naturalization institution
between 1990 and 2003.
Outcome and Explanatory Variables
The goal of our analysis is to examine how immigrant
attributes affect the outcome of naturalization referen-
dums, conditional on applying. For ourmain dependent
variable, we focus on the proportion of “no” votes,
which for each applicant is defined as the fraction
of “no” votes to total valid votes. Since referendums
were decided by simple majority rule, a naturalization
request was rejected if the proportion of “no” votes
exceeded 50%. We also replicate the regressions using
a binary dependent variable coded as 1 for rejected
and 0 for accepted applications; the results from this
alternative measure are very similar. We prefer the
proportion of “no” votes as ourmainmeasure, because
it captures information about the intensity with which
voters rejected an application.
Wemeasure an arrayof personal characteristics from
the voting leaflets that described each applicant to the
voters. We manually code the covariates mentioned
in the applicant descriptions, using a consistent set
of coding rules. Descriptive statistics for the variables
are reported in Appendix A. These variables fall into
four categories. The first category involves sociode-
mographic information such as the applicant’s gender,
age, marital status, number of children, and our re-
search assistants’ binary coding of the picture (attrac-
tive or average).29 The second category captures the
applicant’s integration status. Prospective applicants
were interviewed by municipality officials who eval-
uated whether the applicant was sufficiently well inte-
grated. Officials tested the applicant’s language skills
and assessed whether the applicant was sufficiently fa-
miliar with Swiss habits, customs, and traditions. The
results of these assessments were reported in the voter
29 For a random sample of applicants, we also experimented with
more complex codings, including rankings derived from contests be-
tween randomly paired candidates scored by multiple coders, but
the substantive results were similar to those from the simple binary
coding.
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leaflets. We classify applicants according to whether
their assessed language skills were described to voters
as “excellent,” “good,” “sufficient,” or “insufficient”
command of Swiss-German.We also code several vari-
ables that measure the applicant’s integration status,
differentiating between candidateswhoweredescribed
to voters as “assimilated” (1 if assimilated, 2 if highly
assimilated), “integrated” (1 if integrated, 2 if highly in-
tegrated), “adjusted,” “indistinguishable from a Swiss
citizen,” and “familiar with Swiss customs and tradi-
tions.” These variables capture the definition of the
language and integration requirements in the federal
citizenship law.30
The third set of characteristics measures the appli-
cant’s immigration history. This includes an indicator
for whether the applicant was born in Switzerland, a
variable that measures the number of years the ap-
plicant has lived in Switzerland before the application,
an indicator for whether the applicant entered Switzer-
land as a refugee, and a variable that captures the num-
ber of applications (a few immigrants re-applied). We
also record the country of origin and classify applicants
into the following groups: applicants from richer north-
ern and western European countries (Germany, the
UK, Netherlands, Austria, Scandinavia, etc.); southern
European countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal); (the for-
mer) Yugoslavia;31 Turkey; other central and eastern
European countries (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Re-
public, Russia, etc.); Asian countries (Vietnam, Tibet,
the Philippines, etc.), and a residual category of other
non-European countries (Latin American countries,
African countries, theMiddle East, etc.). This grouping
is based on immigration history and roughly follows
the frequency distribution of the origin countries. Ap-
plicants from Turkey and (the former) Yugoslavia are
coded separately because they constitute the largest
recent immigrant groups and are often at the center
of the current Swiss immigration debate. Applicants
from Italy, Spain, and Portugal are grouped together
because these were historically the sending countries
of the early waves of immigrants in the 1970s. Overall,
about 21% of the applicants in our sample are from
richer northern and western European countries, 18%
are from southern European countries, 31% are from
(the former) Yugoslavia, 15% are from Turkey, 6% are
fromother central and easternEuropean countries, 7%
are from Asia, and 2% are from other non-European
countries.
The fourth set of characteristics measures the appli-
cant’s economic and social credentials.Wemeasure the
30 Notice that there is potentially some heterogeneity in the integra-
tion assessments across municipalities because interviews were con-
ducted by the local municipality official. However, we do not expect
much over time variation in the heterogeneity of the assessments in a
given municipality since turnover among local municipality officials
was very limited in our sample period and assessments were there-
fore typically handled by the same official. Notice that the between-
municipality heterogeneity in the assessments will be absorbed in
the municipality fixed effects that we include in the regressions.
31 This includes applicants from the Socialist FederalRepublic ofYu-
goslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro,
Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia.
number of years of schooling and code three categories:
low education (9 years or less of schooling), medium
education (between 10 and 14 years, corresponding to
a vocational school degree), and high education (more
than 14 years, corresponding to a university degree).
Wealso record the applicant’s skill level, which is coded
from the first digit of the ISCO-88 occupational clas-
sification code. We combine the first two categories
(managers and professionals) as highly skilled, groups
three to five (technicians and associate professionals,
clerical support workers, service and sales workers) as
medium skilled, and the rest (craft workers, assem-
blers, elementary occupations) as low skilled. We also
include a binary indicator for whether the applicant’s
description mentioned any period of unemployment.32
RESULTS
Opposition to Naturalization Requests
Thebox plots in Figure 1 visualize for eachmunicipality
the distribution of the proportion of “no” votes in the
naturalization referendums over the entire study pe-
riod. We find a striking variation across and within mu-
nicipalities (the between variation is about as large as
the within variation). The average proportion of “no”
votes is 37%, but some municipalities such as Wangen
(the averageproportionof “no” votes is 58%)aremuch
more opposed to naturalizing immigrants than other
municipalities such as Stansstad (the average propor-
tion of “no” votes is 12%). This is remarkable given
that these two municipalities are less than 80 kilome-
ters apart, are very similar in size, and have almost
the exact same number of naturalization requests (cf.
Table 1). This between variation may reflect systematic
differences in the pool of applicants, the preferences
of the local electorate, and/or residual variation in the
institutional process. One apparent difference is that
municipalities where voting in the naturalization ref-
erendums took place at the citizens’ assembly have
somewhat weaker opposition to naturalization com-
pared to the larger group of municipalities where bal-
lots were cast at the local polling place (recall that all
municipalities used voting leaflets and closed ballots).
This difference is partly driven by the fact that the
former group of municipalities has a lower share of
32 Due to variations in the format of the voting leaflets, some appli-
cant characteristics were not reported to voters in some municipal-
ities in certain periods. Note that this is not missing data in the tra-
ditional sense; voters simply could not observe this information. We
therefore do not use commonmissing data techniques (such asmulti-
ple imputation), but followRosenbaum (2009, 241) and augment the
covariate set for the regressions with missingness indicators so that
we can use the complete data for the estimation. Each missingness
indicator is coded as 1 if information on a particular characteristic
was not reported to voters and 0 otherwise.Additionally, we fill in the
missing data for the original variables that measure the respective
characteristics with arbitrary fixed values that are not observed for
any applicant (such as −1 for age). Notice that these fill-in values
affect only the coefficients on the missingness indicators (which are
arbitrary and therefore not shown in the regression tables) but not
the coefficients on the actual applicant characteristics.
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FIGURE 1. Opposition to Naturalization Requests
Proportion Voting 'No' on Naturalization Application (%)
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Note: Distribution of proportion of “no” votes across naturalization referendums in each ballot box municipality. Width of box measures
the interquartile range, the vertical line decodes the median.
applicants from (the former) Yugoslavia and Turkey
who—as we show below—have the highest proportion
of “no” votes.33 Apart from the variation between mu-
nicipalities, the most striking feature in Figure 1 is that
33 Other factors may have contributed to this difference. Turnout
was typically lower at the citizens’ assembly since fewer voters were
willing to sit through the meetings. This selection effect could have
increased the proportion of “no” votes if the meetings attracted
more voters concerned about voting against immigrants. However,
meetings were typically dominated by decisions about other mu-
nicipal affairs (e.g., budget, expenditures, etc.) and therefore may
have attracted citizens with more political interest. Empirical data
on attendance is limited, but according to a survey ofmunicipality of-
ficials by Ladner et al. (2009), older residents and residents who have
lived in a community for a long time are typically over-represented
at assembly meetings, while residents with higher incomes and ed-
ucation levels are typically under-represented. This suggests that
the selection effect increased opposition to naturalization requests
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opposition to naturalization requests also varies dra-
matically within each municipality. The interquartile
range of the proportion of “no” votes is about 20 per-
centage points on average, which suggests that aside
from the general differences between municipalities,
local voters reveal very heterogenous preferences for
different types of immigrants who apply in the same
municipality.
Effects of Immigrant Attributes
Why do natives regard some immigrant applicants as
worthy of earning Swiss citizenship while rejecting oth-
ers? To explore the revealed immigration preferences,
we regress the proportion of “no” votes on the appli-
cant characteristics and a full set of municipality fixed
effects so that the effects of the applicant characteristics
are identified purely based on the within-municipality
variation. We also include a full set of decade
fixed effects to account for common temporal trends
in the naturalization rate and cluster standard errors
at the municipality level. Model 1 in Table 3 presents
the regression results. To facilitate the interpretation,
Figure 2 plots themarginal effects with 95%confidence
intervals.
The applicant’s country of origin has the most im-
portant impact on the outcome of naturalization ref-
erendums. Holding other characteristics constant, the
proportion of “no” votes for applicants from (the for-
mer) Yugoslavia is about 15 percentage points higher
(t value > 14.5) than for observably similar applicants
from richer northern and western European countries
(the reference category). This constitutes an increase
of about 40% over the average proportion of “no”
votes. Turkish applicants fare just as poorly with an
average proportion of “no” votes that is 13 percentage
points higher (t value > 10.7), a 35% increase over the
average level of opposition. We find similar penalties
of about 6 percentage points (t value > 5.2) for appli-
cants fromother central or easternEuropean countries,
about 3.5 percentage points (t value > 2.3) for appli-
cants from Asian countries, and about 7 percentage
points (t value > 4.7) for applicants from other non-
European countries. Applicants from southern Euro-
pean countries are the only ones who earn a lower
proportion of “no” votes compared to observably sim-
ilar applicants from richer northern and western Euro-
pean countries, although the premium is small at about
1.4 percentage points and falls short of conventional
significance levels. Taken together, country of origin
accounts for about 40% of the within-municipality
variation in the levels of opposition to naturalization
requests.
(in survey studies, education and income are commonly negatively
correlated, and age is positively correlated with anti-immigrant
sentiment). Finally, social interaction at the assembly meetings could
have also affected the votes in subtle ways. Voters may have felt a
greater sense of scrutiny by others, and this social pressure could
have affected votes even though voting occurred by closed ballots
and naturalization requests were rarely openly discussed.
What else affects the likelihood of being rejected
for citizenship? We find that sociodemographics such
as age, gender, marital status, attractiveness, or chil-
dren have little effect overall. If anything, middle-aged
applicants (21–60 years) earn a penalty of about 2 per-
centage points compared to the reference category of
younger applicants (≤20 years), but there is no such
penalty for older applicants (≥60 years).
The applicant’s immigration history matters some-
what for the naturalization success. Applicants who
are born in Switzerland earn a premium of about 2
percentage points (t value > 2.7) compared to foreign-
born applicants. This effectmay seemsurprisingly small
from a comparative perspective given that place of
birth is themain requirement for granting citizenship in
jus soli countries such as theUnited States. Natives also
reward applicants for longer residency in Switzerland,
but the rewards are rather paltry. A 10-year increase
in residency decreases the proportion of “no” votes by
merely 1.7 percentage points on average (t value> 4.4);
given this modest effect size, even an implausibly large
increase from the shortest to the longest residency in
our sample (75 years) would not be sufficient to com-
pensate for the disadvantage that applicants from (the
former) Yugoslavia and Turkey face due to the country
of origin effects. History as a refugee and the number
of prior applications have no consistent effects on the
level of opposition.
We find that voters systematically reward appli-
cants for better economic credentials. Applicants in
the highest occupational skill category (managers, se-
nior officials, professionals, etc.) earn a premium of
about 2.6 percentage points compared to applicants
in the lowest skill category (elementary occupations,
assemblers, etc.). Similarly, immigrants with high edu-
cational attainment earn a premium of about 1.2 per-
centage points compared to observably similar appli-
cants with low education levels, again a very mod-
est gain compared to the magnitude of the origin
disadvantages.34 Applicants who experienced a period
of unemployment face a penalty of about 6 percent-
age points, suggesting that voters have a rather strong
distaste for such applicants. This effect is fairly ro-
bust but not very precisely estimated since there are
few applicants with unemployment experience in our
sample.
Assessed language skills have almost no effect on
naturalization success. There are no significant dif-
ferences in the proportion of “no” votes for appli-
cants who are described to voters as having suffi-
cient or a good command of German. Even applicants
who speak the local Swiss-German dialect perfectly
(“perfektMundart”) earn no significant advantage. The
only exceptions are applicants for whom officials de-
scribe their language skills as insufficient. The pro-
portion of “no” votes for this group is 20 percentage
34 The results are similar if we use the continuous years of schooling
measure; for example, it would require an implausible 56 years of
education for an applicant from Turkey to make up for her origin-
based disadvantage.
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TABLE 3. Effect of Applicant Characteristics on Opposition to Naturalization Request
Model No. (1) (2)
Dependent Variable Proportion Voting “No” Rejected (0/1)
Mean (0–100) 36.7 0.24
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Year: 1980s (0/1) 0.34 (1.54) 0.00 (0.02)
Year: 1990s (0/1) −0.31 (2.83) 0.01 (0.05)
Year: 2000s (0/1) −1.09 (4.33) 0.01 (0.08)
Sociodemographics:
Male (0/1) 0.74 (0.61) −0.02 (0.02)
Married (0/1) 0.36 (0.80) 0.02 (0.03)
Children (0/1) 0.90 (1.05) 0.02 (0.03)
Age: 21–40 years (0/1) 1.13 (0.77) 0.03 (0.03)
Age: 41–60 years (0/1) 2.28 (0.72) 0.05 (0.03)
Age: 60+ years (0/1) 1.30 (1.71) 0.10 (0.07)
Attractive (0/1) 0.53 (0.99) −0.02 (0.03)
Immigration History:
Applications (#) −0.10 (0.78) 0.02 (0.03)
Born in Switzerland (0/1) −2.07 (0.75) −0.07 (0.03)
Years since Arrival (#/10) −1.75 (0.39) −0.03 (0.01)
Refugee (0/1) −0.27 (1.34) −0.04 (0.05)
Economic Credentials:
Education: Middle (0/1) −0.53 (0.49) −0.05 (0.02)
Education: High (0/1) −1.20 (0.93) −0.09 (0.04)
Skill: Middle (0/1) −0.81 (0.60) −0.02 (0.02)
Skill: High (0/1) −2.61 (0.77) −0.06 (0.03)
Unemployment (0/1) 5.60 (2.65) 0.20 (0.06)
Language Skills:
Language: Excellent (0/1) −1.12 (2.01) 0.03 (0.16)
Language: Good (0/1) −0.55 (1.65) 0.07 (0.17)
Language: Insufficient (0/1) 20.35 (9.78) 0.20 (0.17)
Integration Status:
Integration: “Assimilated” (0–2) −1.90 (0.99) −0.05 (0.03)
Integration: “Integrated” (0–2) −0.24 (0.73) −0.00 (0.03)
Integration: “Adjusted” (0/1) −0.14 (2.15) 0.09 (0.05)
Integration: “Indistinguishable” (0/1) −3.14 (1.20) −0.13 (0.04)
Country of Origin:
Southern European Countries (0/1) −1.41 (1.07) −0.01 (0.02)
Central & Eastern Europe (0/1) 6.18 (1.18) 0.09 (0.04)
(former) Yugoslavia (0/1) 14.59 (1.00) 0.30 (0.05)
Turkey (0/1) 13.26 (1.23) 0.29 (0.04)
Asian Countries (0/1) 3.29 (1.38) −0.07 (0.04)
Other Non-European Countries (0/1) 6.85 (1.43) 0.02 (0.04)
Constant 37.42 (3.29) 0.28 (0.19)
Fixed Effects for Municipalities Yes Yes
P Value from Joint Tests
Sociodemographics 0.01 0.06
Immigration history 0.00 0.05
Economic credentials 0.00 0.00
Language skills 0.23 0.58
Integration status 0.04 0.00
Country of origin 0.00 0.00
Applications 2,429 2,429
Municipalities 44 44
R squared 0.67 0.41
Note: Point estimates and parenthesized standard errors (clustered by municipality) shown from OLS regressions with municipality
fixed effects. The dependent variable is the proportion of “no” votes in Model 1 and a binary indicator coded as 1 for rejected and
0 for accepted applications in Model 2. The reference categories for the various contrasts are as follows: an indicator for the years
1970–1979, applicants with age <20 years, with low education, in low skilled jobs, with “sufficient” command of one of the Swiss
languages, who are familiar with “Swiss traditions and customs,” and originating from a richer northern and western European country.
P values shown from an F test for joint significance of the batch of variables for sociodemographics, immigration history, economic
credentials, language skills, integration status, and country of origin, respectively.
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FIGURE 2. Effect of Applicant Characteristics on Opposition to Naturalization Requests
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Effect on Proportion Voting 'No' (%)
Note: Marginal effect estimates with robust 95% confidence intervals based on OLS regression of proportion of “no” votes on applicant
characteristics and municipality and decade fixed effects (Model 1 in Table 3). The reference categories are as follows: applicants with
age <20 years, low education, in low skilled jobs, “sufficient” command of one of the Swiss languages, who are familiar with “Swiss
traditions and customs,” and originating from a richer northern and western European country. The average proportion of “no” votes is
37%.
points higher (t value > 2) compared to applicants
with sufficient language skills (the reference category).
We need to be careful in drawing strong conclusions
from this finding, since we have only six applicants
with insufficient skills in our sample; thus the estimate
is very imprecise with a 95% confidence interval of
[1.2; 39.5].35 Moreover, we cannot reject the null that
all the language dummies are jointly insignificant at
conventional levels, which adds further evidence that
language skills are inconsequential for naturalization
success once other applicant characteristics are con-
trolled for.
35 This is why we omitted this estimate from Figure 2.
Wefind someevidence that the assessed immigration
status affects opposition to naturalization requests, but
again the impact of this factor is fairly small. We find
no significant differences in the proportion of “no”
votes for applicants who are described as “integrated,”
“adjusted,” or “well familiar with Swiss traditions and
customs” (the reference category), but immigrantswho
are described to voters as completely “indistinguish-
able” from a Swiss native receive a premium of about
3 percentage points.
Model 2 in Table 3 replicates the same specification
with a linear probability model that replaces the pro-
portion of “no” votes with a binary dependent variable
that measures whether the naturalization application
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was rejected or accepted. The overall results from this
model are very similar. The main country of origin
effects are, if anything, slightly stronger: applicants
from Turkey and (the former) Yugoslavia have about
a 30-percentage-point higher probability of being re-
jected for citizenship compared to observably similar
applicants from richer northern and western European
countries—awhopping 120% increase over the average
probability of being rejected. The only difference in the
origin effects is that the penalties for the small groups of
applicants from Asian and other non-European coun-
tries are no longer significant at conventional levels,
which suggests that for these groups the findings are
not robust.
Overall, the results from both measures yield a clear
picture. Naturalization referendums are mostly de-
cided based on the applicant’s country of origin. The
origin effects are more important than other applicant
characteristics forwhichwefind significant effects, such
as economic credentials and immigration history. Once
these factors are controlled for, language skills and in-
tegration status play only a minor role.
Robustness: Private Information
How robust are the country of origin effects? One
potential concern is that some voters may act upon
private information that they possess about certain ap-
plicants that goes beyond the information provided in
the leaflet. The effect of private information is theo-
retically ambiguous and depends on whether it leads
voters to be more or less inclined to vote for a par-
ticular applicant. For example, an immigrant whose
application is being voted on could try to mobilize
her Swiss friends to vote for her. Many of the dif-
ferences in such mobilization efforts are presumably
captured by various covariates (e.g., the years since ar-
rival, born in Switzerland, education level, etc.). How-
ever, residual differences in unobserved mobilization
efforts may still bias our country of origin effects if,
for example, immigrants from Turkey and (the former)
Yugoslavia are more or less effective in activating their
network of friends to vote for them compared to im-
migrants from richer northern and western European
countries.
Another form of private information that could af-
fect thenaturalizationoutcome is gossip. If an applicant
has a personal enemy in town who spreads negative
gossip against her that extends beyond the information
on the leaflet, then this could sway some voters to reject
the application. Such gossip effects do not necessarily
constitute an ordinary omitted variable bias. In fact,
to the extent that negative gossip is systematically tar-
geted toward applicants from particular origin groups,
such as immigrants from (the former) Yugoslavia and
Turkey, it should be considered part of the origin effect
that the regression intends to capture since in such
cases applicants face a penalty because of their origin.
We can exploit variation in municipality size to test
how sensitive our results are to potential bias induced
by the presence of private information. Assume that
voters in each municipality can be partitioned into
two types: “knowledgeable” voters who are exposed to
private information beyond the applicant characteris-
tics reported in the leaflet, and “ignorant” voters who
are exposed only to the information in the leaflet.36
Since the reach of private information is limited, we
can expect that the proportion of knowledgeable vot-
ers declines as the size of the electorate increases. For
example, an applicant may be able to mobilize a fixed
number of friends to vote for her, but the impact of
these votes on the outcome of the referendum will be
increasingly negligible in larger municipalities. Simi-
larly, gossip against an applicant may reach a consid-
erable fraction of voters in small municipalities, but is
unlikely to affect a significant fraction of voters in large
municipalities such as Chur, Emmen, and Schwyz.
In Table 4, we replicate our benchmark model for
three subsamples: large municipalities with more than
5,000 voters, smaller municipalities with less than 5,000
voters, and municipalities where votes were cast at
the polling place. If private information is an impor-
tant confounder, then we would expect that the origin
effects vary strongly between small and large munic-
ipalities. Instead, we find that the origin effects are
almost identical across subsamples for the proportion
of “no” votes (Models 1–3) and the binary rejection
indicator (Models 4–6). If anything, the origin disad-
vantage for immigrants from (the former) Yugoslavia
andTurkey is slightly larger in the largermunicipalities.
This strongly suggests that our results are not driven
by omitted variable bias that may arise from private
information.
The limited effects of private information are per-
haps not surprising for several reasons. First, during our
fieldwork we did not find any systematic evidence that
applicants invested significant effort to campaign for
their naturalization requests. Second, we may expect
that large effects from gossip are not systematic, but
rather limited to a few extreme cases. Third, for voters
in our ballot boxmunicipalities, voting in naturalization
referendums was part of their usual direct democratic
routine in which they were frequently asked to de-
cide on municipal, cantonal, and federal referendums
dealing with all sorts of issues, and turnout for local
naturalization referendums was commonly driven by
turnout for other, potentially more important, referen-
dums voted on the same day. Presumably then, voters
rarely had an incentive to treat naturalization referen-
dums as a special event and seek out additional infor-
mation about applicants beyond what was provided in
the leaflets.
Robustness: General Hidden Bias
An alternative method for examining how robust
the results are to hidden bias from unobserved con-
founders is to conduct a formal sensitivity analysis fol-
lowing the methods developed in Rosenbaum (2002).
We compare applicants from (the former) Yugoslavia
36 We thank the editor for suggesting this distinction.
173
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000494
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:55:28, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Who Gets a Swiss Passport? February 2013
TABLE 4. Effect of Applicant Characteristics on Opposition to Naturalization
Request in Large and Small Municipalities
Proportion Voting
Dependent Variable “No” (0–100) Rejected (0/1)
Included Municipalities: Large Small Polling Place Large Small Polling Place
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year: 1980s (0/1) −0.83 1.70 −0.12 −0.01 −0.03 −0.01
(0.69) (2.86) (1.92) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Year: 1990s (0/1) −4.26 3.33 1.24 −0.09 0.04 0.02
(2.59) (3.37) (3.93) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Year: 2000s (0/1) −6.70 4.23 −0.32 −0.10 0.05 0.03
(5.77) (2.99) (5.95) (0.12) (0.06) (0.11)
Sociodemographics:
Male (0/1) 1.52 −0.03 1.22 −0.03 −0.01 −0.01
(0.92) (0.61) (0.56) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Married (0/1) 0.66 0.12 0.88 0.07 −0.03 0.04
(1.16) (1.06) (0.93) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Children (0/1) 0.90 0.34 1.08 −0.01 0.03 0.03
(1.81) (0.96) (1.33) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Age: 21–40 years (0/1) 2.17 −0.02 1.25 −0.01 0.08 0.05
(1.26) (0.89) (0.79) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age: 41–60 years (0/1) 3.49 0.70 2.11 0.02 0.07 0.06
(0.89) (1.03) (0.63) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Age: 60+ years (0/1) 1.11 0.95 1.01 0.06 0.17 0.10
(2.60) (2.25) (2.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Attractive (0/1) 0.65 0.14 0.56 −0.02 −0.05 −0.03
(1.81) (0.93) (1.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
Immigration History:
Applications (#) −0.85 −0.44 −0.29 0.01 −0.02 −0.01
(0.61) (1.16) (0.85) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Born in Switzerland (0/1) −3.04 0.77 −2.06 −0.08 −0.01 −0.05
(0.89) (1.27) (0.81) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Years since Arrival (#/10) −1.14 −1.96 −1.70 −0.02 −0.03 −0.02
(0.51) (0.71) (0.42) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Refugee (0/1) 2.60 −5.19 0.90 −0.01 −0.14 −0.01
(0.99) (1.57) (1.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Economic Credentials:
Education: Middle (0/1) −1.06 −0.16 −0.61 −0.02 −0.07 −0.05
(0.66) (0.75) (0.55) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Education: High (0/1) −2.40 0.02 −1.35 −0.11 −0.08 −0.09
(1.57) (1.19) (1.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Skill: Middle (0/1) −1.78 0.19 −0.68 −0.04 0.02 −0.02
(0.63) (0.84) (0.66) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Skill: High (0/1) −2.59 −2.62 −2.46 −0.08 −0.03 −0.06
(0.99) (1.10) (0.94) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Unemployment (0/1) 9.17 2.06 5.42 0.29 0.08 0.19
(4.13) (2.52) (2.71) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Language Skills:
Language: Excellent (0/1) 1.92 −6.62 −0.52 0.17 −0.15 0.07
(2.92) (2.60) (2.22) (0.26) (0.10) (0.18)
Language: Good (0/1) 1.59 −6.20 −0.31 0.24 −0.21 0.12
(2.15) (3.13) (1.76) (0.23) (0.13) (0.17)
Language: Insufficient (0/1) 18.89 20.09 0.17 0.23
(10.12) (9.74) (0.20) (0.15)
Integration Status:
Integration: “Assimilated” (0–2) −0.60 −3.05 −1.70 −0.03 −0.08 −0.03
(0.49) (0.88) (1.25) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Integration: “Integrated” (0–2) −0.39 −0.74 −0.42 −0.02 0.00 −0.01
(1.67) (0.74) (0.71) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Integration: “Adjusted” (0/1) −3.63 3.36 −0.74 0.00 0.15 0.06
(1.28) (1.13) (1.89) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Integration: “Indistinguishable” (0/1) −2.26 −4.62 −2.68 −0.17 −0.08 −0.10
(1.92) (1.36) (1.30) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
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TABLE 4. Continued.
Proportion Voting
Dependent Variable “No” (0–100) Rejected (0/1)
Included Municipalities: Large Small Polling Place Large Small Polling Place
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country of Origin:
Southern European Countries (0/1) −1.16 −2.16 −1.54 −0.02 −0.02 −0.03
(1.60) (1.26) (1.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Central & Eastern Europe (0/1) 8.15 3.60 6.40 0.11 0.07 0.12
(1.37) (1.61) (1.29) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
(former) Yugoslavia (0/1) 15.63 13.44 15.55 0.32 0.28 0.39
(1.42) (1.44) (1.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkey (0/1) 13.18 13.50 13.64 0.29 0.27 0.33
(1.79) (1.63) (1.31) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05)
Asian Countries (0/1) 2.79 4.12 2.85 −0.05 −0.05 −0.08
(1.77) (1.62) (1.57) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Other Non-European Countries (0/1) 7.39 6.17 5.74 −0.01 0.04 0.03
(2.51) (1.79) (1.90) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06)
Constant 38.41 43.01 37.82 0.41 0.36 0.21
(4.73) (4.32) (4.18) (0.29) (0.16) (0.20)
Fixed Effects for Municipalities yes yes yes yes yes yes
Applications 1,208 1,221 1,917 1,208 1,221 1,917
Municipalities 10 34 31 10 34 31
R2 0.64 0.73 0.58 0.39 0.49 0.41
Note: Point estimates and parenthesized standard errors (clustered by municipality) shown from OLS regressions with
municipality fixed effects. The dependent variable is the proportion of “no” votes in Models 1–3 and a binary indicator coded
as 1 for rejected and 0 for accepted applications in Models 4–6. Models 1 and 4 are based on large municipalities with more
than 5000 voters in 2003, Models 2 and 5 are based on small municipalities with less than 5000 voters in 2003, and Models
3 and 6 are only based on municipalities where the ballots were cast at the polling place. The reference categories for the
various contrasts are as follows: an indicator for the years 1970–1979, applicants with age <20 years, with low education, in
low skilled jobs, with “sufficient” command of one of the Swiss languages, who are familiar with “Swiss traditions and customs,”
and originating from a richer northern and western European country. For all models, the standard errors are virtually identical
if the block (by municipality) bootstrap is used, and about 50% smaller if no clustering is used.
and Turkey with applicants from richer northern and
western European countries and first nonparametri-
cally adjust for the observed applicant characteristics
from the benchmark model using Genetic Matching
(Diamond and Sekhon 2006; Sekhon 2011). The origin
effect estimates from the (bias-adjusted) matching are
shown in Table 5. They confirm that applicants from
Turkey and (the former) Yugoslavia receive a much
higher proportion of “no” votes and are much more
likely to be rejected compared to observably similar
applicants from richer northern and western European
countries (the effect sizes are very similar compared
to those from the regressions in Table 3). Next, we
conduct Rosenbaum sensitivity tests to pinpoint the
degreeof hiddenbias due to anunobserved confounder
that would be needed to explain away these origin
effects.
Borrowing from the causal inference literature,
we can define applicants who report (the former)
Yugoslavia or Turkey as their origin in the leaflet as the
“treatment group,” and applicants who report a richer
northern and western European country as their origin
in the leaflet as the “control group” (the “treatment”
therefore consists of manipulating the reported origin
that voters observe). The degree of hidden bias is mea-
sured with the RosenbaumGamma, . This parameter
is defined as the upper bound on the degree to which
observably similar applicants from the two different
origin groups may nonetheless differ in their a priori
odds of receiving the treatment due to differences in
a powerful omitted variable that is a near-perfect pre-
dictor of naturalization success.37 Notice that if  = 1,
the comparison between observably similar applicants
from the two origin groups is assumed to be free of
37 Consider two observably similar applicants i and j. Let πi be the
probability that applicant i is assigned to the treatment; then  is
defined as the upper bound on the odds ratio: 1

≤ πi(1−πj )(1−πi)πj ≤ .
Rosenbaum shows that is also equivalent to the upper boundon the
coefficient δ that measures the effect of the unobserved confounder
ui on the unit’s log odds of being treated, log
(
πi(1−πj )
(1−πi)πj
)
= δ(ui −
uj ) ≤ log(). The unobserved confounderui is assumed to be almost
perfectly predictive of the outcome and bounded between 0 and 1.
See Rosenbaum (2002) for details.
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TABLE 5. Effect of Applicant Characteristics on Opposition to
Naturalization Request: Matching Results and Sensitivity Analysis
Origin Group Turkey Yugoslavia
Proportion Voting
Outcome “No” (0–100)
Origin Penalty 11.49 14.8
Std. Error 1.70 1.21
Lowest Rosenbaum Gamma ():
Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test Insignificant (p > 0.05) 10.5 8.7
Outcome Rejected (0/1)
Origin Penalty 0.31 0.27
Std. Error 0.05 0.04
Lowest Rosenbaum Gamma ():
McNemar’s Test Insignificant (p > 0.05) 10.9 10.4
Note: The origin penalty refers to the estimated difference in the proportion of “no” votes
(upper panel) or the probability of being rejected (lower panel) between applicants from
(the former) Yugoslavia or Turkey and observably similar applicants from richer northern
and western European countries. Estimated differences are based on average treatment
effect (ATE) estimates from 1:1 bias-adjusted genetic matching (with replacement) with
Abadie-Imbens standard errors. For all models, only applicants originating from richer
northern and western European countries or the former Yugoslavia and Turkey are used.
The matching and bias adjustments include all covariates from the benchmark model.
Below the ATE estimates and standard errors the table also displays results for the Gamma
estimates from Rosenbaum sensitivity tests. The Rosenbaum Gamma () measures the
degree of departure from a study that is free of bias; it is equivalent to the size of the log of
the coefficient on an unobserved confounder. For the proportion of “no” measure, these tests
refer to the lowest Rosenbaum Gamma () at which the upper bound of the p value from
the Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test turns insignificant (p > 0.05). For the binary rejection measure
the results refer to the lowest Gamma at which the upper bound of the McNemar’s test turns
insignificant (p > 0.05).
hidden bias as the odds of treatment assignment is
identical for the groups (as in a randomized experi-
ment). A value of  = 2 allows for considerable hidden
bias; of two observably similar applicants, one could be
up to twice as likely to receive the treatment due to
differences on the omitted variable.
How sensitive are the matching estimates to hidden
bias? The rows below the effect estimates in Table 5
report the lowest  at which the effect estimates turn
insignificant at the 95% confidence level (Keele 2010).
We find that the results are very robust to hidden bias
with  values ranging between 9 and 11. This implies
that only an enormous hidden bias could explain away
the origin effects. Net of the observed covariates, an un-
measured confounder would need to be a near-perfect
predictor of naturalization success and produce a 9- to
11-fold increase in the odds of treatment assignment.
This level of insensitivity to hidden bias far exceeds
those typically found for social science studies where 
values are commonly in the range of 1–2 (DiPrete and
Gangl 2004; Keele 2010; Rosenbaum 2002; 2005).38
38 Cornfield et al. (1959), in their famous sensitivity analysis for ob-
servational studies of smoking as a cause of lung cancer, found that
to explain away the effects an unmeasured confounder would need
to be an almost perfect predictor of lung cancer and about nine times
more likely among smokers than among nonsmokers.
Robustness: Further Issues
We conducted various additional checks that fur-
ther support the robustness of our main findings
(results are reported in Appendix B). In particular,
Tables B.1 and B.2 replicate the benchmark models
for the different municipality samples (all, large, and
polling place) using several other control strategies,
including year fixed effects, quadratic time trends, and
linear and quadratic municipality specific time trends
to absorb smooth trends in unobserved confounders
that vary at the municipality level. The results are re-
markably stable across the specifications for all sub-
samples. In Table B.3, we control for the lagged share
of applicants from (the former) Yugoslavia and Turkey
in each municipality (three-year moving average) and
the number of applicants who appear on the ballots39
and the results are unaffected. Next, we estimate a
series of models where in each municipality we regress
the proportion of “no” votes on the country of origin
indicators and a streamlined set of covariates (gender,
marital status, age, born in Switzerland, years of res-
idency, and years of schooling) to accommodate the
smaller sample sizes (we exclude municipalities with
fewer than 15 applications). In Figure B.1, we plot
39 The average municipality put about five applicants on the same
ballot (the median is 4).
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the municipality-specific origin effects with 95% ro-
bust confidence intervals for applicants from Turkey
and (the former) Yugoslavia. The effect estimates are
positive, sizable, and significant, revealing that Turkish
andYugoslavian applicants face a considerable penalty
compared to observably similar applicants from richer
northern and western European countries in almost
all of the ballot box municipalities; the estimated in-
crease in the proportion of “no” votes is between 12
and 24 percentage points in most municipalities (about
a 32–64% increase over the average proportion of “no”
votes). Finally, we investigate themodel dependency of
the origin effects in the full sample across a wide range
of possible specifications. In particular, we fit 15,000
regressions of the proportion voting “no” on the origin
indicators and a subset of the control variables that
we randomly draw from the set of all possible subsets
of the covariates from the benchmark model and all
their first-order interactions (and squared terms for
continuous variables). Figure B.2 shows the distribu-
tion of the origin effect estimates. The results from
this extreme bound analysis suggest that the origin ef-
fects are remarkably robust with effect sizes clustering
closely around the magnitudes estimated in the main
regression.
Comparison with Attitudinal Data
Webriefly contrast our findingswith comparable public
opinion data. In 2002, the European Social Survey, a
widely used survey in the comparative literature on
immigration attitudes (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010),
measured the views of Swiss voters about immigrants
from different source countries. Seventy-four percent
of respondents said that they are in favor of allow-
ing more immigrants from poorer European countries
to come and settle in Switzerland, while only 69% of
respondents supported more immigration from richer
European countries. Sixty-nine percent were in fa-
vor of more immigrants from poorer non-European
countries, and only 64% in favor of immigrants from
richer non-European countries. Clearly, our behavioral
data suggest different preferences, as applicants from
Turkey, (the former) Yugoslavia, and other central
or eastern European countries are rejected at much
higher rates than applicants from richer northern and
western European countries. These differences may
stem from social desirability bias if survey respondents
are unwilling to admit that they actually prefer im-
migrants from richer origins. More recent survey data
point to a similar contrast between public opinion and
behavioral data in voter preferences. In a 2008 poll,
88% of Swiss voters agreed that naturalization deci-
sions should be free of discrimination based on country
of origin.40 This sharply contrasts with our finding that
country of origin is the single most important determi-
nant of naturalization success.
40 The original question wording was “Beim Einbu¨rger-
ungsverfahren darf es nicht zuDiskriminierungen nach derHerkunft
der Einbu¨rgerungswilligen kommen.” (Vox poll 06/01/2008. Item:
arg04x.)
INTERPRETATION
The results raise two important questions for the in-
terpretation. First, does the consistently higher level
of opposition for applicants from certain origins im-
ply that native voters discriminate against these appli-
cants? If so, how do our findings relate to theories of
discrimination?
Country of Origin Effects as Discrimination
Our results imply that applicants who differ only in
their country of origin and are otherwise similar on
all measured characteristics face much different prob-
abilities of being rejected when applying in the same
municipality, under the same institutional rules, and
in the same time period. Are these findings consistent
with a nondiscriminatory selection rule that is blind to
the origin of the applicant?As detailed above, the natu-
ralization law implies that candidates for naturalization
have to meet a list of requirements. Federal authori-
ties always check that applicants meet the residency
and criminality requirements so the differential treat-
ment cannot be accounted for by these factors (voters
are aware that applicants have cleared these hurdles).
Moreover, language requirements and integration sta-
tus and familiarity with Swiss values and traditions are
controlled for in our analysis using assessments by the
municipality officials who interview the applicants and
inform voters about the assessments. A selection rule
that is neutral to country of origin would therefore
imply that, conditional on these observed characteris-
tics, the probability of being rejected should be similar
across applicants of different origins. Instead, we find
that otherwise observably similar applicants face dra-
matically different rejection rates depending on their
country of origin. In fact, the applicants’ country of
origin is by far the most important predictor of the nat-
uralization outcome compared to all other observed
characteristics, which implies that voters distinguish
between applicants in part based on their origin. This
matches the legal definition of discrimination as stated
in the antidiscrimination clause in the Swiss Constitu-
tion.
Causes of Discrimination
As Pager and Shepherd (2008, 12) put it in their recent
review, “Measuring the prevalence of discrimination is
difficult; identifying its causes is farmore so.”Nonethe-
less, it is worth asking which mechanisms may underlie
the discrimination that we find. Below, we try to distin-
guish between the main theories of discrimination by
testing additional observable implications.
The literature commonly distinguishes two main
theories: statistical discrimination and taste-based
discrimination.41 Theories of statistical discrimination
41 For recent reviews of social theories of discrimination, see Pager
and Shepherd (2008); Altonji and Blank (1999); Lang and Lehmann
(2010).
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(Arrow 1972; Phelps 1972) emphasize how discrimina-
tion can arise due to problems of limited information.
Assume that voters have a utility function such that
they hold no animus against particular origin groups
but care only about naturalizing applicants with a suffi-
ciently high level of integration (which may encompass
sufficient language skills and familiarity with Swiss val-
ues and traditions as stipulated by the naturalization
law). Voters also take it for an empirical fact that the
average integration levels vary by origin, for example,
voters presume true that the integration level among
immigrants fromTurkey and (the former)Yugoslavia is
lower on average compared to immigrants from richer
northern andwesternEuropean countries.42 Since inte-
gration levels are inherently difficult to measure, these
voters face a signal extraction problem when deciding
how to vote in the naturalization referendums. The
voters would like to evaluate an applicant based purely
on her true level of integration, but this true level is
unobserved and needs to be inferred from the noisy
signal of the assessed integration level reported in the
voter leaflet. To solve this signal extraction problem, ra-
tional voters place weight on the noisy signal and prior
information about the origin group to which an appli-
cant belongs. In other words, it is optimal for voters to
use their knowledge about an origin group generally to
evaluatewhether aparticular applicant from that group
is likely to be sufficiently integrated since the most
accurate estimate of an applicant’s actual integration
level is a weighted average of his assessed integration
level from the leaflet and the average integration level
of his origin group. This may explain why, even when
faced with applicants who report the same assessed
integration level, voters still estimate the actual inte-
gration level of individual Turkish and (former) Yu-
goslavian applicants as relatively lower, because voters
evaluate such applicants more like the average Turkish
or Yugoslavian immigrant.43
42 Government reports and studies have consistently documented
that, given limited opportunities and disadvantages, Turkish and
Yugoslavian immigrants in Switzerland have considerably lower lev-
els of education and language acquisition on average compared to
immigrants from richer northern and western European countries
(Bundesamt fu¨r Migration 2006; Rommel 2006). For example, in
2003 the fraction of immigrants with tertiary education was 55%
among employed immigrants from richer northern and western Eu-
ropean countries, compared to 9% among employed immigrants
from Turkey and the West Balkans. See Bundesamt fu¨r Statis-
tik, SchweizerischeArbeitskra¨fteerhebung (SAKE) 2003. Education
and language are often seen as important determinants of immi-
grants’ social integration.
43 A similar result occurs even if voters take for a fact that differ-
ent immigrant groups have the same average level of integration,
but simply find the integration status of Turkish and Yugoslavian
immigrants more difficult to assess, and therefore their signal is pre-
sumed noisier. See Lang and Lehmann (2010) for a formal review
of theories of statistical discrimination. Notice that statistical dis-
crimination still qualifies as discrimination in a legal sense. The key
difference to models of taste-based discrimination discussed below
is that statistical discrimination is based on uncertainty, not taste.
Although conceptually distinct, the two models could be combined
if, for example, we assume that voters’ assessments of the differences
in the average integration levels of different origin groups are based
on prejudice rather than empirical facts.
If the differences in naturalization success stem from
statistical discrimination, then we would expect that
Turkish and Yugoslavian applicants earn relatively
higher returns for other observable credentials such
as education that can be informative about the appli-
cant’s actual integration status. From the perspective of
voters who are solving the signal extraction problem,
learning that a particular applicant is highly educated
or highly skilled should lead to a larger increase in
the estimated integration level for applicants from (the
former)Yugoslavia andTurkey compared to applicants
from richer northern and western European countries,
if voters presume that the former origin group has a
lower average integration level. To test this implica-
tion, we re-estimate our benchmarkmodel while allow-
ing the effects of economic credentials to vary across
the applicant’s origin. For tractability, we restrict the
sample to contrast applicants from richer northern and
western European countries and applicants from (the
former) Yugoslavia and Turkey, and we combine the
latter into a single origin group.
Table 6 displays the results. Consistent with statisti-
cal discrimination, the interaction terms between ori-
gin and high occupational skills or high educational
attainment are negative and significant, which implies
that (former) Yugoslavian and Turkish applicants earn
relatively higher returns for economic credentials. For
example, Model 1 reveals that among immigrants from
(the former) Yugoslavia and Turkey the average pro-
portion of “no” votes for highly skilled applicants is
about 5.3 percentage points lower compared to low-
skilled applicants (t value > 2.8). In contrast, skill
level has no impact on the proportion of “no” votes
among immigrants from richer northern and western
European countries (the effect estimate on the lower-
order term is close to zero). We find similar differential
returns to education (Model 2), and the results are
similar when we restrict the sample to polling place
municipalities (Models 3 and 4).Although these results
are consistent with statistical discrimination, they also
reveal that statistical discrimination can only partly
account for origin-based discrimination. Even taking
the differential returns to economic credentials into
account, highly skilled applicants from (the former)
Yugoslavia and Turkey still face a penalty that is about
7–8 percentage points higher compared to observably
similar applicants from richer northern and western
European countries. This observation suggests that sta-
tistical discrimination may account for at least about
40% of the overall origin effect.
What else besides statistical discrimination may ex-
plain the discriminatory outcomes that we find? The
other leading alternative are taste-based theories of
discrimination (Becker 1971; Quillian 2006) that oper-
ate on the assumption that natives have real prejudice
and animus against particular origin groups. In these
models, discrimination arises not from uncertainty, but
from presumed xenophobic tastes built into the voters’
utility function. Such xenophobic tastes may include
a wide range of feelings or beliefs that certain immi-
grant groups, such as applicants from (the former) Yu-
goslavia and Turkey, are culturally inferior and socially
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TABLE 6. Statistical Discrimination: Interaction Effect of Economic
Credentials and Country of Origin on Opposition to Naturalization
Request
Dependent Variable Proportion Voting “No” (0–100)
Included Municipalities: All Polling Place
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Year: 1980s (0/1) −0.17 −0.16 −0.87 −0.97
(1.64) (1.63) (1.92) (1.88)
Year: 1990s (0/1) 0.38 0.32 2.10 2.01
(2.62) (2.65) (3.40) (3.46)
Year: 2000s (0/1) 1.29 1.23 2.24 2.13
(4.19) (4.27) (5.49) (5.61)
Male (0/1) 0.57 0.55 0.88 0.89
(0.75) (0.74) (0.76) (0.76)
Married (0/1) 0.29 0.28 0.89 0.85
(0.95) (0.96) (1.11) (1.12)
Children (0/1) 1.98 1.82 1.98 1.81
(0.99) (0.96) (1.13) (1.12)
Age: 21−40 years (0/1) 1.64 1.61 1.88 1.81
(0.79) (0.81) (0.77) (0.79)
Age: 41−60 years (0/1) 2.38 2.38 2.29 2.28
(0.95) (0.95) (0.93) (0.94)
Age: 60+ years (0/1) 4.27 3.61 3.60 2.60
(2.18) (2.24) (2.72) (2.73)
Attractive (0/1) 0.70 0.48 0.66 0.46
(1.06) (1.01) (1.14) (1.07)
Applications (#) −0.82 −0.78 −1.02 −1.00
(0.82) (0.85) (0.90) (0.91)
Born in Switzerland (0/1) −1.35 −1.36 −1.43 −1.38
(1.14) (1.15) (1.49) (1.47)
Years since Arrival (#/10) −1.65 −1.68 −1.61 −1.59
(0.64) (0.62) (0.76) (0.75)
Refugee (0/1) −5.07 −4.84 −2.91 −2.71
(2.36) (2.36) (2.37) (2.33)
Education: Middle (0/1) −0.92 1.38 −0.95 2.08
(0.62) (1.45) (0.67) (1.14)
Education: High (0/1) −2.71 0.41 −2.52 1.20
(0.95) (1.73) (1.03) (1.64)
Skill: Middle (0/1) 0.62 −0.11 1.14 0.45
(1.35) (0.73) (1.57) (0.77)
Skill: High (0/1) 0.54 −2.39 0.57 −2.22
(1.52) (1.08) (1.85) (1.23)
Unemployment (0/1) 6.48 5.84 5.90 5.33
(2.70) (2.81) (2.79) (2.82)
Language: Excellent (0/1) −0.45 −0.51 −0.14 −0.20
(2.65) (2.68) (2.70) (2.76)
Language: Good (0/1) 0.19 0.22 0.14 0.15
(2.53) (2.53) (2.50) (2.52)
Language: Insufficient (0/1) 28.40 28.41 28.88 28.81
(3.09) (3.06) (3.03) (3.03)
Integration: “Assimilated” (0–2) −2.66 −2.58 −2.07 −1.93
(1.37) (1.39) (1.56) (1.54)
Integration: “Integrated” (0−2) 0.49 0.53 0.12 0.12
(0.65) (0.66) (0.61) (0.61)
Integration: “Adjusted” (0/1) −0.82 −0.78 −1.34 −1.36
(3.38) (3.42) (2.93) (2.98)
Integration: “Indistinguishable” (0/1) −3.53 −3.46 −3.17 −3.12
(1.31) (1.28) (1.35) (1.30)
(former) Yugoslavia & Turkey (0/1) 13.51 14.31 14.02 15.66
(1.19) (1.36) (1.46) (1.51)
Skill: High × Yugoslavia & Turkey −5.32 −4.88
(1.90) (2.32)
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TABLE 6. Continued.
Dependent Variable Proportion Voting “No” (0–100)
Included Municipalities: All Polling Place
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Skill: Middle × Yugoslavia & Turkey −0.83 −0.80
(1.58) (1.92)
Education: High × Yugoslavia & Turkey −4.86 −5.19
(2.10) (2.36)
Education: Middle × Yugoslavia & Turkey −2.95 −3.76
(1.71) (1.51)
Constant 37.35 37.07 36.23 35.11
(3.72) (3.87) (4.07) (4.14)
Fixed Effects for Municipalities Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,617 1,617 1,294 1,294
Municipalities 43 43 31 31
R2 0.70 0.70 0.61 0.61
Joint Significance Test 0.027 0.073 0.13 0.042
Note: Point estimates and parenthesized standard errors (clustered by municipality) shown from OLS
regressions with municipality fixed effects. For all models, only applicants originating from richer northern
and western European countries or (the former) Yugoslavia and Turkey are used. Models 1 and 2 are
based on the full sample of ballot box municipalities, Models 3 and 4 are based on municipalities where
the ballots were cast at the polling place.
undesirable, and perceptions that such groups threaten
the prevailing way of life or even reject Swiss culture
and refuse to assimilate (Allport 1979; Blumer 1958;
Dovidio et al. 1997;Kinder andSears 1981;Tajfel 1982).
Testing the model of taste-based discrimination re-
quires a measure of voters’ xenophobic tastes. We can-
not measure the tastes of individual voters, but we can
exploit the variation in xenophobic tastes across mu-
nicipalities using municipality-level vote shares from a
1982 federal anti-immigration referendum that called
for removing restrictions on immigration. The share of
“no” votes from this referendum, which occurred close
to the beginning of our sample period, is a good proxy
for the xenophobic tendencies of the local electorates.
If the discrimination is driven by taste, wewould expect
that the intensity of origin-based discrimination—as
measured by the size of the disadvantage for Yugosla-
vian and Turkish applicants—increases with the local
level of xenophobia.
In Table 7, we test this hypothesis by re-estimating
our benchmark model with an interaction term be-
tween the anti-immigrant vote share and the country
of origin indicator (we again restrict the sample as
above). We use a fixed effects specification (Models
1 and 3) and a multilevel model in which we also al-
low the origin effect to vary by municipality (Models
2 and 4). The results support taste-based discrimina-
tion as the interaction terms are positive and highly
significant across specifications. The magnitudes im-
ply that a one percentage point increase in the anti-
immigration vote share is associated with about a 0.5–
0.7 percentage point increase in the relative origin-
based disadvantage for applicants from (the former)
Yugoslavia and Turkey. This result suggests that taste-
based discrimination may account for about 60% of
the overall origin-based discrimination. To give a clear
interpretation of the interaction in Figure 3 we plot the
estimated origin-based disadvantage as a function of
the (demeaned) anti-immigrant vote shares (based on
Model 2). In municipalities with the highest levels of
xenophobia, Yugoslavian and Turkish applicants face
a penalty of about 20–30 percentage points compared
to observably similar applicants from richer northern
and western European countries. This penalty is much
lower at about 3–10 percentage points in the least xeno-
phobic municipalities. Also consistent with taste-based
discrimination, themodels reveal that the level of xeno-
phobia is uncorrelated with the proportion of “no”
votes for applicants from richer northern and west-
ern European countries (the lower-order terms for the
anti-immigrant vote are close to zero). As a robustness
check, Table B.2 in the appendix replicates the models
using two alternative measures of xenophobic tastes,
the municipality-level vote shares from similar federal
anti-immigration referendums in 1983 and 1988, and
the patterns are very similar. Taken together, these re-
sults indicate that origin-based discrimination is largely
driven by local voters’ xenophobic prejudice.Wewould
not expect such strong patterns if the discrimination
were purely statistical.44
44 We also conducted additional tests to see if the origin effect sim-
ilarly interacts with the local unemployment rate, a good proxy for
local economic conditions. We find that the interaction effect is zero
and highly insignificant (Table B.5 in the Appendix). These findings
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TABLE 7. Taste-Based Discrimination: Interaction Effect of Xenophobic Preferences
and Country of Origin on Opposition to Naturalization Request
Dependent Variable Proportion Voting “No” (0–100)
Included Municipalities: All Polling Place
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Year: 1980s −0.74 −0.64 −0.53 −0.91
(1.67) (1.15) (1.98) (1.25)
Year: 1990s 0.67 0.73 3.50 2.92
(2.74) (1.31) (3.41) (1.44)
Year: 2000s 1.69 1.48 3.67 2.90
(4.20) (1.36) (5.43) (1.51)
Male (0/1) 0.59 0.45 0.71 0.57
(0.74) (0.59) (0.79) (0.65)
Married (0/1) 0.34 0.40 1.03 1.10
(0.87) (0.88) (1.03) (0.99)
Children (0/1) 1.99 1.99 1.70 1.69
(0.94) (0.82) (1.05) (0.95)
Age: 21–40 years 1.63 1.63 1.80 1.73
(0.80) (0.78) (0.78) (0.87)
Age: 41–60 years 2.13 1.99 2.18 2.09
(1.00) (0.97) (0.99) (1.14)
Age: 60+ years 3.32 3.43 3.30 2.93
(2.03) (1.60) (2.51) (1.91)
Attractive (0/1) 0.51 0.04 0.62 0.26
(1.01) (0.73) (1.09) (0.74)
Applications (#) −1.20 −1.14 −1.20 −1.14
(0.79) (0.60) (0.85) (0.60)
Born in Switzerland (0/1) −1.40 −0.83 −1.53 −1.08
(1.19) (0.87) (1.55) (0.97)
Years since Arrival (#/10) −1.45 −1.51 −1.62 −1.59
(0.64) (0.43) (0.74) (0.46)
Refugee (0/1) −5.39 −3.56 −2.30 −2.74
(2.59) (2.02) (2.08) (2.15)
Education: Middle (0/1) −0.69 −0.78 −0.93 −0.94
(0.63) (0.65) (0.73) (0.68)
Education: High (0/1) −2.11 −2.01 −2.37 −1.97
(1.00) (1.18) (1.08) (1.25)
Skill: Middle (0/1) 0.11 0.03 0.65 0.54
(0.66) (0.65) (0.73) (0.72)
Skill: High (0/1) −2.09 −2.55 −1.91 −2.42
(1.07) (0.93) (1.28) (0.99)
Unemployment (0/1) 5.54 5.25 4.95 4.70
(2.86) (2.00) (2.84) (2.02)
Language: Excellent (0/1) −0.65 −1.21 −0.31 −0.92
(2.67) (2.51) (2.62) (2.51)
Language: Good (0/1) 0.25 −0.23 0.15 −0.58
(2.49) (2.73) (2.35) (2.76)
Language: Insufficient (0/1) 28.38 26.10 28.95 26.17
(2.97) (5.93) (2.93) (5.90)
Integration: “Assimilated” (0–2) −2.10 −2.20 −1.54 −1.80
(1.28) (0.70) (1.40) (0.71)
Integration: “Integrated” (0–2) 0.29 −0.28 0.00 −0.50
(0.66) (0.78) (0.64) (0.78)
Integration: “Adjusted” (0/1) −0.85 −1.02 −1.14 −1.48
(3.38) (2.53) (2.97) (2.51)
Integration: “Indistinguishable” (0/1) −3.27 −3.30 −3.17 −3.28
(1.18) (1.42) (1.25) (1.41)
(former) Yugoslavia & Turkey (0/1) 13.31 13.62 12.01 12.99
(1.20) (1.20) (1.46) (1.34)
Anti-immigrant vote share in 1982 (%) 0.05 −0.15
(0.12) (0.17)
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TABLE 7. Continued.
Dependent Variable Proportion Voting “No” (0–100)
Included Municipalities: All Polling Place
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Yugoslavia & Turkey × vote share 0.51 0.47 0.75 0.58
(0.14) (0.12) (0.21) (0.17)
Voting Location: Assembly (0/1) −10.25
(2.10)
Constituency: All voters (0/1) −0.52 −4.38
(3.47) (4.99)
Constant 37.15 40.28 35.86 42.84
(4.01) (4.81) (4.13) (5.96)
Effects for Municipalities Fixed Random Fixed Random
Applications 1,617 1,617 1,294 1,294
Municipalities 43 43 31 31
R2 0.70 0.62
Variance of varying intercepts 18.99 13.68
Variance of varying slopes 29.53 18.17
Residual variance 79.83 78.08
Note: Point estimates and parenthesized standard errors shown. Models 1 and 3 are OLS regressions with
municipality fixed effects and standard errors clustered by municipality. Models 2 and 4 are restricted maximum
likelihood multilevel regressions with varying intercepts and slopes for the country of origin indicator. The random
effects are allowed to vary by municipality and their correlation is unrestricted. The random effect models include
dummies for the municipality specific institutional features (i.e., voting location and constituency, respectively).
For all models, only applicants originating from richer northern and western European countries or (the former)
Yugoslavia and Turkey are used. Models 1 and 2 are based on the full sample of ballot box municipalities, Models
3 and 4 are based on municipalities where the ballots were cast at the polling place.
The results thus far suggest that origin-based dis-
crimination in naturalization referendums is driven by
statistical and taste-based discrimination, and that the
lattermechanism is perhapsmore important.Although
models of taste-based discrimination commonly treat
tastes as exogenous, one interesting follow-up question
involves the origins of voters’ xenophobic prejudice. A
detailed examination of this issue is beyond the scope
of this study, but the data allow us to briefly speculate
about potential mechanisms.
One potential hypothesis is that animus against ap-
plicants from (the former) Yugoslavia and Turkey is
driven by differences in religion if voters perceive
these immigrants asMuslim (Adida, Laitin, andValfort
2010). We cannot test this claim directly since the vot-
ing leaflets typically do not contain information about
the applicant’s religion. However, for the group of ap-
plicants from (the former) Yugoslavia we can exploit
the fact that applicants from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo, and Macedonia are more likely to be Muslim
compared to applicants from Serbia and Montenegro,
Macedonia, and Slovenia, since the share of Muslims
is much higher in the former group of countries. If
might suggest that the cultural threat is perhapsmore important than
the economic threat.
the prejudicial taste against applicants from (the for-
mer) Yugoslavia is primarily driven by Islamophobia,
we would expect strong differences in the origin-based
discrimination that these groups face. However, when
we replicate the benchmark model with dummy vari-
ables for the groups of high and low Muslim countries,
we find that the country of origin disadvantages are
fairly similar (Table B.4 in the Appendix). Opposition
to naturalization requests is slightly higher for appli-
cants from high compared to low Muslim origins, but
the differences are substantivally small and not con-
sistently significant. Taken together, these admittedly
limited tests suggest that Islamophobia is perhaps not
the main source of animus propelling taste-based dis-
crimination.
A perhaps more prominent explanation in the liter-
ature is group conflict theory, which posits that xeno-
phobic prejudice arises as a defensive reaction by na-
tives who view immigrant out-groups as a threat to
the natives’ dominant position (Blalock 1967; Blumer
1958; Quillian 1995). Such threats may operate at an
economic level, if natives are concerned about com-
peting with immigrants for jobs and other scarce re-
sources (Olzak 1994; Scheve and Slaughter 2001), or at
a cultural level, if natives fear that particular immigrant
groups “constitute a threat to the collective identity and
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FIGURE 3. Municipality Specific Country of Origin Effects and Local Xenophobia
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Note: Marginal effect estimate for the interaction of Yugoslavian and Turkish origin and municipal anti-immigrant vote share based
on multilevel regression. The plot builds on the estimates of multilevel Model 2 of Table 7 which regresses the proportion of “no”
votes on applicant characteristics, municipal characteristics, and (de-meaned) anti-immigration vote share in the 1982 referendum.
Random intercepts and slopes for the country of origin indicator allowed to vary unrestrictedly by municipality. Random effects for each
municipality are shown along with 90% prediction intervals.
the cultural, national, and ethnic homogeneity of the
society” (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006,
428).45 One of the main predictions from the group
conflict model is that prejudice dynamically responds
to a rising threat associated with rapid growth in the
size of the out-group. Another prominent view in the
literature is contact theory, which implies the opposite
prediction. According to this model, an increase in the
45 In our case, the economic threat is perhaps less potent since aver-
age unemployment was very low in our municipalities (e.g., 1.3% in
1990), and, if anything, immigrants from richer northern and western
European countries should be more threatening to the job prospects
of the local median voter, compared to Turkish and (former) Yu-
goslavian immigrants who have lower average skill and education
levels andmostlywork inmore segmented labormarkets. In contrast,
the cultural threat could be more potent if voters view the behaviors,
customs, and values of immigrants from (the former) Yugoslavia and
Turkey as less compatible with the Swiss identity, compared to the
cultural norms shared by immigrants from Germany, France, and
other richer northern and western European countries.
out-group can actually decrease prejudice over time
because more frequent intergroup interactions help to
dissolve natives’ stereotypes and preconceived judg-
ments (Allport 1979; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006).
Our data provide a unique opportunity to evaluate
these claims, since we behaviorally measure discrimi-
nation against immigrants from multiple origin groups
over time, and Switzerland—apart from the general
increase in immigration—also experienced rather dra-
matic shifts in its immigration composition during our
time period. Figure 4 shows the trends in the shares of
origin groups of the total foreign-born population over
the 1980–2003period.46 The threatmechanism suggests
that discrimination against applicants from Turkey and
(the former) Yugoslavia should increase over time,
since this immigrant group is relatively new and its rel-
ative size doubled during our time period. In contrast,
46 Detailed data on foreign-born stocks by country of origin before
1980 are unavailable, to our knowledge.
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FIGURE 4. Immigration Trends in Switzerland
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Note: Plot shows the shares of immigrants from different origins on the total foreign-born population (Source: PETRA Database from
Swiss Federal Office of Statistics).
discrimination against applicants from southern Euro-
pean should abate over time, since this origin group has
a much longer immigration history in Switzerland and
the group’s relative size decreases considerably during
our time period. The contact mechanism anticipates
the opposite pattern.
In Table 8, we re-estimate the benchmark model for
three periods (1970–1989, 1990–1999, and 2000–2003);
Models 1–3 use all available data, and Models 4–6 re-
strict the sample to municipalities for which data are
available in all periods. The results are more consistent
with the dynamic threat mechanism as discrimination
against different immigrant origin groups is positively
correlated with growth in their relative sizes. Although
the origin penalty for Turkish and (former) Yugosla-
vian applicants is about 5–7 percentage points in the
1970s and 1980s, it climbs to about 13–18 percentage
points in the post-1990 period following the rapid in-
flux of immigrants from these countries. In contrast,
discrimination against applicants from southern Eu-
rope strongly decreases over time as the relative size
of this group plummets. In fact, in the most recent
period applicants from this group earn a premium of
4–5 percentage points compared to observably similar
applicants from richer northern and western European
countries (the rejection rates for this latter group re-
main fairly stable). This bifurcation indicates that na-
tives’ discriminatory attitudes toward particular out-
groups are not static, but dynamically correlate with
the differential trends in the relative sizes of the origin
groups. The threat mechanism might operate as a two-
way street: rapid growth in the relative size of an out-
group can stoke prejudice against it, but rapid decline
in the group’s relative size may also help to attenuate
prejudice over time.47
47 We also considered whether the size of the origin disadvantage
for applicants from Turkey and (the former) Yugoslavia responds
to changes in the lagged share of applicants from these origins in
a given municipality. The results from this “localized” test of the
dynamic threat hypothesis are consistent with the previous result;
the origin penalty for applicants from Turkey and (the former) Yu-
goslavia is larger the higher the local share of (former) Yugoslavian
or Turkish applicants in the preceding three years (see Table B.7 in
the Appendix).
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TABLE 8. Dynamics of Country of Origin Effects
Dependent Variable Proportion Voting “No” (0–100)
Years 1970–1989 1990–1999 2000–2003 1970–1989 1990–1999 2000–2003
Model No. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Southern European Countries 1.64 −1.35 −4.18 1.10 −0.56 −5.48
(1.19) (1.11) (1.45) (1.22) (1.20) (1.44)
Central & Eastern Europe 1.59 7.22 11.74 2.65 7.03 8.69
(2.14) (1.40) (2.98) (1.95) (1.43) (2.78)
(former) Yugoslavia 5.77 14.82 17.91 5.31 14.53 16.12
(1.73) (1.39) (2.16) (1.72) (1.46) (2.04)
Turkey 7.29 15.01 14.96 7.44 14.23 12.99
(2.55) (1.84) (1.82) (2.46) (1.82) (1.67)
Asian Countries −1.56 4.73 4.67 −1.19 5.61 4.21
(3.13) (1.91) (2.82) (3.35) (1.98) (3.26)
Other Non-European Countries 2.32 4.32 12.31 2.55 4.57 11.92
(2.34) (2.59) (2.34) (2.25) (3.06) (2.73)
Constant 35.04 33.12 36.47 35.40 32.13 40.86
(6.20) (3.81) (4.90) (6.34) (4.22) (5.58)
Observations 683 860 886 647 723 651
Municipalities 31 42 42 29 29 29
R squared 0.55 0.78 0.84 0.57 0.79 0.86
Note: Point estimates and parenthesized standard errors (clustered by municipality) shown from OLS regressions. The models
replicate the benchmark model for different time periods. Model 1 and 4 are based on applications in the years 1970–1989, Models
2 and 5 are based on applications in the years 1990–1999, and Models 3 and 6 are based on applications in the years 2000–2003.
Models 1–3 are based on all available data; Models 4–6 are restricted to the same 29 municipalities for which data are available in
all periods. All models are estimated with the full set of benchmark covariates and fixed effects for each municipality (coefficients not
shown). Models 1 and 4 also include a decade fixed effect for the 1980s.
CONCLUSION
Many studies of anti-immigration sentiment are based
on subjective survey data and limited to examining atti-
tudes toward immigration in general. Using behavioral
data from naturalization referendums in Swiss munic-
ipalities, our analysis demonstrates that immigration
preferences in fact vary dramatically regarding differ-
ent types of immigrants and over time. In particular,
we show that observably similar applicants face dra-
matically different rejection rates depending on the
applicants’ country of origin, which matches the le-
gal definition of discrimination according to the Swiss
Constitution.
In particular, we find that immigrants from (the for-
mer) Yugoslavia and Turkey face the highest proba-
bility of being rejected compared to immigrants from
all other origins. Other immigrant attributes, such as
immigration history and economic credentials, also af-
fect naturalization success, but to a much lesser degree.
Language skills and an immigrant’s assessed immigra-
tion status play almost no role in naturalization suc-
cess.Disentangling the causal pathways of origin-based
discrimination, the results suggest that about 40% of
the measured differences in the opposition to natu-
ralization requests may be attributable to statistical
discrimination and about 60% to taste-based discrimi-
nation. Overall, these results are consistent with argu-
ments linking anti-immigrant sentiment to widespread
prejudice against particular immigrant groups (Dust-
mann and Preston 2007; Hainmueller andHiscox 2007;
Kinder and Sears 1981; Sides and Citrin 2007).
How generalizable are our results? The data indi-
cate that the municipalities in our sample are not very
different from municipalities in other parts of Switzer-
land, and our results are consistent across subsamples.
Hence, ourmain findingsmay generalize to the country
as a whole, or at least to the German-speaking regions.
External validity beyond Switzerland is much more
difficult to judge, and we advise against over- or under-
generalizing the results to a cross-national context. On
the one hand, Switzerland is unique in many respects.
Given the fierce immigration debates and the lasting
success of the Swiss People’s Party, the discrimination
against immigrant out-groups that we foundmight rep-
resent an upper bound compared to other countries
where right-wing parties have been less successful in
recent decades. On the other hand, Switzerland, given
its exceptionally large immigrant population and var-
ied history involving the peaceful integration of four
different language traditions, is a vanguard, rather than
a laggard, country in terms of cultural heterogeneity
(Linder 2010). Another interpretation of our findings,
then, is that cultural and ethnic tensions between the
native and immigrant populations in Switzerland are
perhaps not that different from the xenophobic rifts
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emerging in many other European countries similarly
struggling with conflicts about immigration and citi-
zenship policies. Studies of anti-immigrant sentiment
have consistently shown that prejudices against im-
migrants run high in many other European countries
(Dustmann and Preston 2007; Hainmueller andHiscox
2007), and right-wing parties have also experienced
significant electoral support in several countries. It is
therefore not readily apparent why we would expect
to see dramatically different results if voters in these
countries were given the opportunity to voice their
preferences regarding immigrants in popular votes. In
the end, external validity is of course best addressed by
comparing the results of several internally valid studies
conducted in different circumstances and at different
times, and thus we hope this study will stimulate more
behavioral research on anti-immigrant sentiment and
discrimination in other countries.
Our results also have implications for the sizable lit-
erature on direct democracy in which scholars still pro-
foundly disagree about the impact of direct democracy
on minority interests (Frey and Goette 1998; Gamble
1997; Hajnal, Gerber, and Louch 2002; Maskin and
Tirole 2004). Given the specific focus of our study,
concluding that referendums generally harm minori-
ties would be unwise. However, our microlevel results
shed light on at least one central issue: access to cit-
izenship in a country where local voters used their
direct democratic means to discriminate against par-
ticular minority groups. The profound disadvantage in
naturalization success for applicants from (the former)
Yugoslavia and Turkey emphasizes concerns raised by
previous studies that primarily out-group minorities
suffer when their civil rights are put to a popular vote
(Vatter and Danaci 2010). These concerns are further
supported by a follow-up study in which we exploit the
Federal Court ruling and examine how naturalization
outcomes changed, once the ballot box municipalities
were forced to transfer the decision about naturaliza-
tion requests from popular referendums to an elected
municipality council (Hainmueller and Hangartner
2012). There we found that naturalization rates soared
once accountable legislators, rather than the people,
voted on naturalization requests. Moreover, the in-
crease in naturalization rates resulting from replacing
direct with representative democracy was largest for
immigrants from (the former) Yugoslavia and Turkey,
the groups that fared the worst in naturalization ref-
erendums. More research is clearly needed, but taken
together, this evidence helps to empirically ground the
heated policy debates about naturalization procedures
in Switzerland and raises concerns about recent pro-
posals to restore secret ballot referendums to decide
on naturalization requests.
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